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Resumo 
 
Esta dissertação foi realizada por uma aluna da Faculdade de Ciências da 
Universidade de Lisboa, com licenciatura em Matemática Aplicada e atualmente a 
frequentar o mestrado em Informática. A proposta desta dissertação veio do departamento 
de Cibersegurança (DCY) da Altice Portugal (MEO) e a área de especialização é 
aprendizagem máquina (machine learning). 
Nos últimos anos, especialmente em grandes organizações, o roubo de informação 
confidencial tem vindo a ser uma problemática cada vez maior. Este tipo de ataque tem, 
normalmente, duas origens distintas: colaboradores maliciosos ou malware instalado, 
possivelmente proveniente de um ataque de phishing. No entanto, atividade anónima sem 
intenção maliciosa também pode ser relevante, pois pode ser um indicador de um uso 
incorreto de recursos da rede ou de uma violação de política. 
Este trabalho aborda este problema de segurança através da aplicação de técnicas 
de aprendizagem máquina com o objetivo de detetar anomalias, correspondentes a 
atividades ilícitas, no registo de acessos a dados de informações de clientes e/ou meta-
dados feitos por utilizadores de backoffice,. Um dos objetivos é a distinção dessas 
anomalias, mais concretamente, a classificação dessas situações de roubo de informação 
confidencial em diferentes tipos, para que as pessoas responsáveis pela parte posterior da 
investigação interna saibam o que devem procurar. Para além disso, procuramos reduzir 
ao máximo o número de falsos positivos, mantendo um grau de deteção elevado. 
Anteriormente, a empresa realizou um projeto com o mesmo objetivo final, no 
entanto, com uma metodologia completamente distinta. Nesse projeto foram aplicados 
métodos de estatística descritiva e heurísticas simples para a deteção de anomalias, tendo 
sido intitulou de Cuscos. O projeto Cuscos detetou um número bastante elevado de 
anomalias (1800), contudo identificou-se um número muito alto de possíveis falsos 
positivos, tendo sido uma problemática. Adicionalmente, a impossibilidade de distinguir 
os diferentes tipos de atividade ilícita, constituiu um obstáculo, tendo, assim, cada 
anomalia que ser estudada individualmente para que se descobrisse a sua causa. Como se 
pode ver pelos objetivos acima descritos, este projeto procura solucionar estas 
dificuldades. 
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Primeiro, fez-se uma caracterização estatística dos dados, onde se decidiu que 
características (features) dos dados originais deviam ser criadas ou extraídas para a 
construção de conjuntos de dados (datasets) e, posteriormente, para a aplicação dos 
algoritmos de aprendizagem máquina (machine learning) escolhidos. Nesta, foram 
consideradas duas abordagens: uma em ordem aos utilizadores e outra direcionada aos 
números de telefone. Como tal, foram criados dois conjuntos de dados, um para cada 
abordagem. De seguida, executaram-se os procedimentos necessários de pré-
processamento e normalização dos dados. Finalmente, foram aplicados algoritmos de 
agrupamento de dados e deteção de anomalias aos conjuntos de dados criados. Os 
algoritmos de agrupamento de dados considerados foram: k-means, DBSCAN e affinity 
propagation; e os algoritmos de deteção de anomalias escolhidos foram: elliptic 
envelope e isolation forest. Para determinar os parâmetros adequados de cada um desses 
algoritmos, foram definidos intervalos de parâmetros e criadas tabelas de pontuação com 
os resultados obtidos a partir da aplicação desses algoritmos com as diferentes 
combinações de parâmetros. Para obter resultados específicos para diferentes perspetivas 
analíticas, além de serem aplicados em todo o conjunto de dados construído, os algoritmos 
também foram aplicados a diferentes combinações de algumas de suas características. 
Tendo em conta que as anomalias finais são referentes a utilizadores, os resultados 
da abordagem dos números de telefone tiveram de ser convertidos, isto é, os utilizadores 
que acederam aos números de telefone considerados como anomalias pela aplicação dos 
algoritmos substituíram os números de telefone, sendo, assim, os utilizadores as 
anomalias consideradas. Em cada abordagem, foi escolhido um método de ensemble para 
decidir quais dos utilizadores detetados seriam considerados anomalias finais. 
Finalmente, obtiveram-se os resultados finais através de um ensemble por união do 
conjunto de resultados de ambas as abordagens e, posteriormente, criaram-se regras de 
decisão para classificar as anomalias em diferentes categorias. 
Os resultados finais cumpriram todos os objetivos: detetaram-se anomalias 
relevantes de situações correspondentes a acessos ilícitos, reduziu-se o número de falsos 
positivos e cada anomalia detetada está classificada consoante o tipo de comportamento 
que representa. 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: aprendizagem automática, cibersegurança, roubo de informação, 
deteção de anomalias 
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Abstract 
 
In recent years, especially in large organizations, the theft of valuable information 
has increasingly become a major problem.  
This project focuses on users access to information related to customer telephone 
numbers inside a telecom company. The objective is to, through machine learning 
techniques, detect illicit accesses to this information, focusing on those likely to match 
information theft actions.   
First, we made a statistical characterization of the data. Decided which features 
should be created or extracted from data to build the necessary datasets (two different 
approaches) to apply the algorithms, and then the required pre-processing and 
normalization procedures were executed. Finally, we applied clustering and anomaly 
detection algorithms to detect anomalies in the datasets. The algorithms considered were: 
k-means, DBSCAN, affinity propagation clustering methods, elliptic envelope and 
isolation forest anomaly detection methods. To determine optimal parameters for the 
algorithms on this data, parameter ranges were defined and score tables were created with 
the results obtained from different combinations of parameters. To obtain specific results 
for different analytic perspectives, besides being applied on the entire datasets built, the 
algorithms were also applied to different combinations of some of their features. Finally, 
after the algorithms application, ensemble methods were chosen and decision rules were 
created to classify the anomalies in different categories. 
The final results met all objectives. Relevant anomalies were detected in situations 
corresponding to illicit accesses, the number of false positives was reduced and each 
detected anomaly is classified according to the type of behavior it represents. 
 
 
Keywords: machine learning, cybersecurity, information theft, anomaly detection 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This dissertation was elaborated by Mariana Galhardas Pina, a student from 
Faculdade de Ciências of Universidade de Lisboa with a bachelor degree in Applied 
Mathematics and currently in a master’s degree in Informatics. The proposal for this 
dissertation came from the cybersecurity (DCY) department of Altice Portugal (MEO), 
so the dissertation was carried out at the DCY department premises. The specialization 
area is machine learning and the problem being worked is towards anomaly detection. 
 
1.1  Motivation 
The theft of valuable information is a major problem in companies nowadays. This 
type of attack can usually have two distinct origins: the discovery and access to valuable 
information by malicious collaborators; or malware installed inside the network, 
originated from a phishing attack or hackers, for example. However, anomalous activities 
with no malicious intent may be relevant, because they may be an indicator of incorrect 
use of network resources or a security policy violation. It is in this kind of security 
problem that this project focus. The goal is to find anomalies in the log of queries made 
by users, to detect cases of the situations mentioned previously, and therefore contribute 
to the security of the company. 
The use of machine learning in big data contexts is growing in most business areas, 
as it can help to find patterns, predicting results, reaching decisions, and find easier ways 
to get to these results. Nowadays, working with big data happens in most technology and 
online companies, and interpreting this data to reach conclusions is a very common 
problem. Machine learning provides algorithms that can facilitate this analysis: clustering 
and classification tasks, which along with anomaly detection techniques can contribute to 
effectively find relevant outliers, which are segments of data that do not follow the most 
common patterns. Anomalies in data can have different root causes, depending on the 
dataset. Regardless if they are good or bad, it can be useful to find those cases to eliminate, 
control, or even, augment them. In the specific application considered in this work, the 
goal is to uncover illicit data access activities and prevent harmful consequences for the 
company. 
2 
 
1.2  Objectives 
The main objective is to employ machine learning techniques to implement a 
methodology to detect illicit data access activities that are likely to match information 
theft actions, detecting the less false positives possible. In addition to detecting the 
relevant anomalies, we want to be able to discriminate between different situations of 
illicit behavior. This will improve the company awareness on this kind of situations that 
might be occurring, as it will unveil the users and the type of illicit action they are 
undertaking. With this information, the company can then perform an internal 
investigation and pursue the necessary disciplinary or legal actions. 
1.3  Document Structure 
The document is organized by chapters, each one of them containing topics. Here it 
will be, briefly, explained each chapter. 
 
Chapter 2: The second chapter is the related work, it will present the relevant 
theory in the area of this dissertation. It contains the subjects needed to be 
known to understand this project. It explains the origin of this project and 
which others methods have been applied to solve this kind of problem. 
 
Chapter 3: The third chapter is the methodology and explains all the steps 
executed to reach the results. 
 
Chapter 4: This chapter explains the results. In this chapter, all the results, 
based on the methodology used, are shown and the final decisions are 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 5: The fifth chapter contains the conclusions and possible future 
work to investigate this kind of problem. 
 
Chapter 6: The last chapter contains references to papers, links or books 
consulted to get the needed information. 
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Chapter 2 Related Work 
 
2.1  Previous Studies 
 
The company had a previous project, named Cuscos, using the same data with the 
same purpose. As the first approach to the same problem, Cuscos used simple descriptive 
statistical methods and simple heuristics to detect anomalies. In summary, from the 
original data, a dataset was created indexed by <user, telephone number> pairs. The 
features created characterized which users accessed the data of which telephone numbers. 
The median of each feature of the dataset was calculated, and with that median, for each 
<user, telephone number> pair features, the standard deviation was calculated. Then a 
threshold was chosen, and the pairs that had a standard deviation above the threshold were 
considered anomalies. This project captured a large number of anomalies (1800 
anomalies) but had the problem of dealing with a potentially large number of possible 
false positives. With such amount of anomalies, it was never possible to investigate all of 
them. Another problem of the Cuscos methodology was the fact that it was not possible 
to discriminate different potential situations of illicit behavior, each anomaly had to be 
studied to discover why it was considered an anomaly. In this approach to the same 
problem instead of a descriptive statistical method, various machine learning algorithms 
will be used in various perspectives of the data to obtain more reliable anomalies. A 
process of classification of the anomalies will also be executed so that each anomaly 
obtained is already labeled as a specific type. 
The paper “A survey of network anomaly detection techniques” [5] includes 
anomaly detection through classification, statistical methods, and clustering. The 
classification algorithms were used in an unsupervised environment. The algorithms used 
were support vector machine, bayesian networks, and neural networks. For the statistical 
methods, a distance measure based on the chi-square test statistic is developed and 
principal component analysis (PCA) is also used to detect anomalies. Finally, the 
clustering algorithms application seemed very efficient. Nearest neighbor, K-means and 
variations of k-means were used. The results after clustering are a division of the data 
based on similarity. Looking at the clusters dimension and distances it is possible to 
conclude that the ones with the biggest dimension are representative of the most common 
behavior, while the smallest clusters and farther away must be the samples that distance 
themselves from the pattern the most. This project will implement clustering algorithms 
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and it will also add specific anomaly detection algorithms to work together to detect 
anomalies. 
The anomaly detection algorithms were brought to the table through the paper 
“Smart Audio Sensors in the Internet of Things Edge for Anomaly Detection” [12], it 
proposes a design framework for smart audio sensors able to record and pre-process raw 
audio streams, before wirelessly transmitting the computed audio features to a modular 
IoT gateway. Both Elliptic Envelope and Isolation Forest were deployed on an affordable 
IoT gateway to detect anomalous sound events happening in an office environment. Such 
good results in detecting anomalies to a different problem but with the same purpose 
(anomaly detection) brought up an interest in the way these algorithms would behave in 
this situation. 
After deciding to use clustering algorithms it was necessary to determine the most 
appropriate ones. A promising algorithm, Affinity Propagation, is described in 
“Clustering by Passing Messages between Data Points” [10]. In most clustering 
algorithms the number of clusters has to be previously chosen, but affinity propagation 
can determine the best number of clusters alone, the way this algorithm works will be 
explained in a forthcoming subsection. 
An interesting methodology was seen in the paper “An Application of Machine 
Learning to Anomaly Detection” [15]. To learn the characteristic patterns of actions, a 
temporal sequence was created (an ordered, fixed-length set of temporally adjacent 
actions) for each user, as the fundamental unit of comparison for a user profile. The basic 
action of the detection system was to compare incoming input sequences to the historical 
data and form an opinion as to whether or not they both represent the same user. The 
fundamental unit of comparison in the anomaly detection system is the command 
sequence. To classify sequences of new actions as consistent or inconsistent with 
sequence history, two fixed-length sequences can be compared using a similarity 
measure. The system computes a numerical similarity measure that returns a high value 
for pairs of sequences that it believes to have a close resemblance and a low value to pairs 
of sequences that it believes largely differ. This methodology seems very interesting and 
it is a future approach to be taken into account, using temporal series to define a pattern 
and obtain which behaviors do not follow it. 
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2.2  Fundaments and Tools 
2.2.1  Jupyter 
Jupyter is an open-source web application that allows users to create and share code 
documents, create code and view results together. Due to this flexibility of programming 
and visualization of the results at the moment, it was the chosen medium to the 
development of the dissertation. 
2.2.2  Python 
The chosen language was python because it is a general purpose programming 
language, very common to use in machine learning and it has very complete and efficient 
libraries for this purpose. 
2.2.3  Machine Learning 
Machine learning is based on the idea that we can learn from data, identify patterns 
and make predictions, with minimal human intervention, which allows us to make 
efficient decisions for a specific set of data. 
Supervised vs unsupervised learning 
Supervised learning is when we have input features (usually called matrix X, with 
one column per feature, one row per record) and output labels (usually called vector Y). 
The idea is to initially fit the algorithm to the data and to the label each record gets based 
on its features. Then after the algorithm was adjusted to the data, it is used to predict 
labels for the data that was not used yet. Since the data is supervised, after predicting the 
labels, we can use supervised evaluation metrics, like confusion matrix and accuracy. 
In unsupervised learning we do not have previous knowledge, so we have just the 
input features (X). The model is fitted to the data anyway, but instead of adapting the 
features to a label it just adapts the model to the data behavior.  
 
 Clustering: Clustering refers to unsupervised learning, which means it can be 
used when dealing with unlabeled data (i.e., data without defined categories). 
The goal of this type of algorithm is to group (cluster) the data based on 
features similarity. 
 Classification: Classification refers to supervised learning, so it needs ground 
truth knowledge, it is the process of predicting the class of given data. The 
6 
 
algorithm must, first, fit the labeled data to get the knowledge of how, based 
on the characteristics, it should label the future data. 
 Anomaly Detection: There is no specific definition of anomaly, it depends 
on the interpretation and situation. It is a record on the data that does not fit 
the standard that is considered "normal". Detection of anomalies is a 
technique where we identify these "abnormal" patterns, which are not what 
would be expected. It can be seen as detection of outliers or detection of 
novelties. The difference between these two terms is the fact that in outliers 
detection the data is “polluted”, which means it contains outliers, it contains 
observations that are far from the others. In novelties detection the data is not 
“polluted” with outliers, we are interested in detecting whether a new 
observation is an outlier. Clustering can help to detect anomalies, by considering 
anomalies the samples associated with much smaller or more distant clusters.  
2.2.4  Clustering Algorithms 
K-means 
K-means is an algorithm that clusters the data by starting with a random division in 
clusters (number of clusters depends on what the user decides), and then recursively 
calculates the distance of the points to the cluster mean to decide in which cluster each 
point should belong to. As seen in [5], it can obtain very good results for anomaly 
detection. 
DBSCAN 
Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN), shown a 
good option for anomaly detection in [11], is an algorithm that clusters based on density. 
It has two important parameters, the minimal distance between points and the minimal 
number of neighbors a point is required to have to be considered valid. Given a set of 
points in a space, it clusters together those that are closer to each other (have the minimum 
number of neighbors, chosen by the user, in its neighborhood). The points in lower density 
regions (that do not satisfy the minimum number of neighbors) will be excluded from any 
cluster and be considered noise points. 
Affinity Propagation 
Affinity Propagation, introduced for anomaly detection in [10], is an interesting 
algorithm to use since it calculates the number of clusters by itself. In Affinity 
Propagation, the data points are seen as a network where all the data points send messages 
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to all other points. The subject of these messages relates to the willingness of the points 
to be “exemplars”. Exemplars are the points that best explain the other cluster data points 
and are the most significant within their cluster. Each cluster has only one exemplar. All 
the data points want to collectively determine which is their exemplar. 
2.2.5  Anomaly detection algorithms 
Elliptic Envelope 
Another interesting approach was to use specific anomaly detection algorithms. This 
algorithm assumes that the regular data came from a Gaussian distribution. From this 
assumption, it tries to define the structure or pattern of the data and can detect outliers as 
observations which stand far enough from the base structure. It fits an ellipse around the 
central points and ignores the ones outside, fitting the data only on the points considered 
“normal”. It then predicts the points not considered “normal” as the outliers. According 
to [12] could be a good contribution to the final results. 
Isolation Forest 
Another algorithm to detect outliers is the Isolation Forest. Also introduced by [12], 
it is based on the logic of the decision trees (decision trees ensemble). It will "isolate" a 
record and randomly choose a feature, and then, randomly again, choose a split value 
between the maximum and minimum value of that feature. Since an outlier is an out-of-
normal record, its features should have more distant values than the ones of a normal 
record, so the split should occur closer to the roots of the trees, that is, the path to isolate 
that record is shorter than the path to isolate a normal record, you need fewer splits. 
2.2.6  Evaluation Metrics 
Evaluation metrics should be applied after the application of the algorithms, and a 
high score in them is needed to have security the results. Below the evaluation metrics 
considered are explained. 
 
o Silhouette Score is a clustering evaluation metric. For each sample, it 
calculates the mean intra-cluster distance (a) and the mean nearest-cluster 
distance (b). The Silhouette Coefficient for a sample is (b - a) / max (a, b). It 
calculates this coefficient for all samples and then returns the mean of all 
coefficients. It varies between -1 and 1, being 1 the best value and -1 the 
worst. A value near 0 indicates overlapping clusters. A negative value, 
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generally, indicates that a sample has been assigned to the wrong cluster, as 
a different cluster is more similar. 
o The Calinski and Harabasz [16] Variance Ratio Criterion (VRC) measures 
the degree of separation between clusters and homogeneity within them. The 
higher the VRC value, the better are the clustering algorithm results expected 
to be. 
 
𝑉𝑅𝐶 =
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝐵/(𝑘 − 1)
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑊/(𝑛 − 𝑘)
 
Where n and k are the total number of samples and the number of clusters in 
the partition, respectively; the B and W terms are the between-cluster and the 
within-cluster sums of squares (covariance) matrices. 
 
Normalization 
Like in most machine learning situations, since we are dealing with features with 
very different intervals, the data needs to be normalized. 
 
o Standardization: Standardizes features by removing the mean and scaling to 
unit variance. The standard score of a sample is calculated by: 
Z= (x-u)/s 
Where u is the mean of the training samples and s is the standard deviation 
of the training samples; 
o Regular Normalization: Scales input vectors individually to the unit norm; 
o Robust Scaler: Scales the features through statistics that are robust to outliers. 
It removes the median and scales the data according to the quantile range. It 
uses the Interquartile Range (IQR). The IQR is the range between the 1st 
quartile (25th quantile) and the 3rd quartile (75th quantile). 
Comparison between the benefits of Data Standardization vs Regular 
Normalization vs Robust Scaler: 
Advantages: 
 
1. Standardization: scales features such that the distribution is centered 
around 0, with a standard deviation of 1; 
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2. Regular Normalization: shrinks the range such that the range is now 
between 0 and 1 (or -1 to 1 if there are negative values); 
3. Robust Scaler: similar to normalization but instead it uses the 
interquartile range to be robust to outliers. 
 
Disadvantages: 
 
1. Standardization: is not good if the data is not normally distributed (i.e. no 
Gaussian Distribution); 
2. Normalization: gets heavily influenced by outliers (i.e. extreme values); 
3. Robust Scaler: does not take the average into account and only focuses 
on the parts where the bulk data is. 
2.2.7  HIDRA 
High Performance Infrastructure for Data Research and Analysis is a highly 
performant, available and scalable datastore used for security analytics, mostly based on 
machine learning, visualization, and forensics, to support fraud investigation and security 
incident response, developed by the Cyber Security and Privacy Direction (DCY) of 
Altice Portugal (MEO). This platform is fed with ETL (Process of data extraction, 
transformation and loading) processes from various security related sources (including 
users accesses to clients telephone numbers information). Hydra's operation is based on 
the integration of 3 base technologies: Elasticsearch, Kibana, and Logstach. 
Elasticsearch 
Elasticsearch1 is a search engine that allows access to high volume data. It is 
available for many languages, such as Java, Python, and Ruby, and allows several types 
of queries (aggregations, intervals, specific values or dates, patterns…) in an easy way, 
which makes it so popular nowadays. It contains a Representational State Transfer 
Application Programming Interface (REST API) which facilitates development. 
Elasticsearch is used in Hydra to efficiently search and filter event data stored by 
indexing information. 
                                                 
1 https://www.elastic.co/ 
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Kibana 
Kibana2 is an open-source platform that allows to explore, visualize and analyze data 
stored with Elasticsearch. It allows to browse, visualize and interact with the data present 
in Elasticsearch indexes. It is a visualization plugin that has the necessary resources to 
study the data through the elaboration of dashboards. 
Logstash 
Logstash is an open-source ETL engine. Each process is organized as a pipeline 
which consists of three phases: collection (input), transformation and enrichment (filter) 
and data forwarding (output). A pipeline can be configured to collect data from multiple 
sources and forward the processed data to multiple destinations. Its architecture is highly 
extensible because each phase has multiple plugins and that allows Logstash to work with 
multiple technologies. It is horizontally scalable by allowing multiple workers to 
distribute the processing load. The internal queue mechanism provides reliability and 
resilience in the occurrence of performance shortages or failures. In the context of this 
project, Logstash is used in HIDRA to collect telephone access events efficiently and 
reliably and store them in Elasticsearch in a clean and organized format for fast search 
and retrieval. 
 
2.2.8  Docker 
Docker is a software which facilitates the creation, deployment and execution of 
software using containers. The main advantages of its use are portability between 
different environments and ease of update because all software and its dependencies are 
packaged inside the container, and security because it runs in an isolated environment 
inside the operating system. In this project Jupyter is used inside a Docker container with 
the image "jupyter/scipy-notebook" [19] to easily reproduce the same results in another 
machine if necessary and to protect other processes in the same machine from the impact 
of high resources usage, typical of machine learning processes. 
                                                 
2 https://www.elastic.co/products/kibana 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
The project methodology is organized in six stages, as illustrated in Figure 1. The 
first stage, with the pre-processing of the data, starts with the logs from elasticsearch that 
are transferred into a jupyter notebook and then all the necessary transformations are 
performed to create the datasets for both approaches. The second stage, with the prepared 
datasets, studies the different perspectives to look at the dataset that can contribute to 
better results. The third stage englobes the improvement and application of the 
algorithms. It receives the datasets in the various perspectives and returns the identities 
considered anomalies in each algorithm application. Finally, we ensemble the anomalies 
obtained. The sixth stage receives the anomalies obtained from the chosen ensemble 
method and classifies them into the different distinctions. Each of these steps will be 
explained in detail in the sub-sections below.
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Figure 1- Project methodology 
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3.1  Data Study 
The data provided is a big set of data logged during the normal working process of 
the company, the logs obtained in the interval period of 6 months create the APPS-RGPD 
dataset. The logs were exported from Elasticsearch to a jupyter notebook where the data 
was studied and treated. The APPS-RGPD dataset (application logs), contains 43 features, 
as shown in Table 1. A log that forms this dataset means that a user accessed an 
application to consult a phone number. Each log characterizes an access, even though we 
are interested in behavior and not user characteristics, all features should be 
acknowledged and studied for a better decision on which records are relevant or not for 
the objective. 
The features contained in the APPS-RGPD dataset are: 
 
Table 1- APPS-RGPD features explained 
action Action performed by the actor, it will mostly 
be reads 
action_details Details about the action 
action_query_invoice Invoice consulted 
action_query_ncc NCC consulted 
action_query_nif NIF consulted 
action_query_other Another field used for the query (not well 
defined) 
action_query_period_end When the action terminated 
action_query_period_start When the action started 
action_query_phone Telephone number that was accessed 
action_result If the action ended successfully or not 
actor Who performed the access 
actor_account_risk Risk classification of the person who made the 
access 
actor_account_state If account is active or inactive 
actor_company Company of who made the access 
actor_department Department of who made the access 
actor_details Details about who accessed 
actor_device_mac MAC address of device used to make the 
access 
actor_device_name Device used to make the access 
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actor_domain Active directory (AD) of who made the access  
actor_identity_id Anonymized identification of who made the 
access  
actor_identity_risk Risk classification (maximum) of the ILA 
identity of the person making the access 
actor_ip IP from where the access was made 
actor_ip_ad_acc AD account associated with this IP 
actor_ip_as_country Origin country of IP 
actor_ip_as_name AS name 
actor_ip_as_number AS number 
actor_ip_hostname Name of the machine from where the access 
was made 
actor_ip_identity_id ID of the AD account associated with this IP 
actor_ip_range_type If client ip is static or dynamic 
actor_location Details of location from where access was 
made 
actor_location_geo Detailed location from where access was 
made 
actor_location_id Location from where access was made 
actor_network_range Range of network from which the access was 
made 
actor_network_type Type of network from which the access was 
made 
actor_type If it is properly possible to associate the actor 
to a person 
count Events number 
decorated Details of the action performed 
hint_actor_ad Account indicated by the SFA portal 
object Application accessed 
object_group Group of the application accessed 
query_features Which ids were in the query 
source Event source 
ts Timestamp 
Source and action will be ignored because the part of APPS-RGPD dataset used does 
not vary in these features. The action is always actors from source arm-audit accessing an 
application to consult telephone numbers. 
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3.1.1  Characterization of APPS-GPD dataset 
A study was performed to gain more knowledge about the data, to find what the 
pattern of the relevant feature's behavior is, and to find which is the behavior that could 
be indicative of an illicit action being undertaken. Since the actors name and the telephone 
numbers are confidential data some plots will have the x-axis legend as a notion of the 
number of actors, identities or telephone numbers being represented. 
Actor 
In the period being studied, there are 7778 actors. The Figure 2 shows the distribution 
of the number of times each actor made an access, the chart highlights two things: most 
actors made accesses only a few times; and a very small fraction of actors made a large 
number of accesses. 
This distribution does not allow us to draw big conclusions because of the contrast 
in the values. As most actors appear only once or a few times and two actors appear 
314102 and 261719 times. If the actors with many accesses are considered outliers and 
excluded from the study, it is possible to see the distribution curve with more detail, as 
presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2- Distribution of the number of times each actor made an access 
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It is possible to see the distribution curve more subtly but the knowledge taken is the 
same. Most actors made accesses very few times compared to the few that made a lot of 
accesses.  
Since in Figure 3 the distribution of the actors that appear less than 1000 times is not 
very perceptive, due to the large range of values, a graphic with the distribution of only 
the actors that appear less than 1000 times is presented in Figure 4. 
 
Another interesting analysis is to find how many different days each actor appears, as 
shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 4 - Distribution of the number of times each actor, which made less than 1000 accesses, made an 
access 
Figure 3- Distribution of the number of times each actor made an access without extreme cases 
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No actor appears more than 184 different days and, as expected, since the majority 
of users only makes one access, mostly appear in just one day. The curve of this 
distribution is much more readable since there is not so much contrast in the number of 
days as there is in the number of times each actor appears, which means that many of the 
accesses are done in the same day. 
Actor_identity_id 
An actor is associated with an identity id, but an identity (person) can have many 
accounts (actor), so the distribution of this field should be similar to the actor field. 
Two actor identities appear much more than the others, -1 (means that the identity is 
unknown), and test user (some users are just test accounts created for monitoring reasons), 
which appear 326921 and 224064 times respectively. They will be left out of our 
distribution for better visualization of this field. Also for the same reason, to study this 
field we will divide it into 3 different graphics. 
First, in Figure 6, we will look at the identities that made the most accesses (above 
10000 times). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5- Distribution of the number of different days each actor made an access 
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This field is empty in 13380 rows. Adding to that situations where the actor identity 
is not known, results in a total of 340301 times a number was accessed and there is no 
knowledge about the user identity id. 
Figure 7 presents the identities that appeared between 10000 and 1000 times.  
 
Figure 6- Distribution of the number of times each user, that made more than 10000 accesses, made an access 
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Identities 
Figure 7- Distribution of the number of times each user, which made between 1000 and 10000 accesses, made 
an access 
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The distribution of the identities that appear more than a 1000 and less than 10000 
times, is similar to the actors’ field. Few user identities were responsible for more than 
1000 accesses, and very few are responsible for more than 4000. 
In Figure 8 we show the distribution of the identities that appear less than 1000 times.  
Most identities access telephone numbers less than 1000 times (5422 different 
identities), and the distribution is, as expected, very similar to the actor's distribution. 
Figure 9 shows how many days each identity made accesses. 
 
Figure 8-Distribution of the number of times each user, which made less than 1000 accesses, made an access 
Figure 9-Distribution of the number of different days each user made an access 
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There is just one id that makes accesses every day. It will probably be a test account, but 
it is expected to be one of the obvious anomalies to be detected. 
Action_query_phone 
Action_query_phone represents the telephone number accessed by a user. It is the 
feature with the most variance, 641292 different telephone numbers are accessed during 
the period in study, therefore, once again, the distribution representation will be separated 
in 3 figures. 
First, in Figure 10 we will be looking at the distribution of the phone numbers that 
are most commonly accessed (are accessed more than 1000 times). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are 22 phone numbers that, in the period of 199 days, were accessed more than 
a 1000 times, the most observed number had 74766 accesses (this number is not 
represented graphically due to the fact that its magnitude would make the distribution 
much less detailed, it is a telephone number created for testing, it was considered an 
outlier and was excluded from the study). 
Figure 11 observes the telephone numbers that were accessed between 1000 times 
and 10 times. 
Figure 10-Distribution of the number of times each telephone number, which was accessed more than 1000 
times, was accessed 
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This distribution shows the most accentuated curve of the 3 plots since it involves a 
large amount of different telephone numbers and a big variance in quantities (the first has 
the biggest variance in quantities but very few telephone numbers, and the third has a lot 
of telephone numbers but a small variance in terms of quantities). 
Figure 12 shows the telephone numbers accessed less than 10 times in the entire 
period. 
As for the other fields, Figure 13 shows how many different days each telephone 
number is accessed, this is useful to discover what the pattern is for the number of days a 
Figure 11-Distribution of the number of times each telephone number, which was accessed between 10 and 1000 
times, was accessed 
Figure 12-Distribution of the number of times each telephone number, which was accessed less than 1000 times, 
was accessed 
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telephone number is accessed, if it is normal to be constantly accessed or, for example, if 
the pattern is for a telephone number to be consulted just one time in the entire period. 
The maximum amount of days a telephone was accessed was in 199 distinct days. 
Object 
Actors access an application to read a telephone number. In Figure 14 we see which 
are the most common applications used. Even though this feature will not affect patterns 
as much as the ones presented before, it is still useful to learn its behavior. 
Figure 14-Distribution of the number of times each application was used to access telephone numbers 
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Objects 
Figure 13-Distribution of the number of different days each telephone number was accessed 
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The most used applications are a and b, the first appearing in 1544429 access logs. 
Also interesting to see is how many different days each application is used, as shown in 
Figure 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The application that is accessed the most is a, being accessed every single day except 
for one. 
 
Studying the distribution of these fields was helpful to learn which are the patterns 
and what is likely to be an anomaly. It was possible to see that the common behavior is 
for a user to do few accesses and, a user that makes several accesses may be indicative of 
illicit behavior. 
 
3.2  Pre-processing 
For the machine learning techniques to be effective, it was necessary to pre-process 
the data. After inspecting the data, it was decided which features of the original dataset 
are useful and should be used, which should be calculated, which should be transformed 
or treated, and which ones are not relevant.  
Figure 15-Distribution of the number of different days each application was used to access telephone numbers 
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As mentioned before, each log obtained from Elastic Search characterizes one access 
made by a user to a telephone number. Since the objective is to find anomalous behaviors, 
these characteristics alone will not be relevant. The relevant part is the behavior formed 
with the junction of accesses by user/telephone number. To obtain this, two approaches 
were performed. 
3.2.1  User Approach 
The users approach will be focused on users. The dataset created is indexed by user 
and has the relevant characteristics that define each user behavior. Our focus was the 
number of times a user made accesses, to how many telephones and in how many days. 
This way it is possible to detect the normal pattern of behavior and, for example, find 
which amounts of times or days is too much or too few, or which relations between 
amount of accesses and telephone numbers are more suspicious. 
From the logs obtained from Elastic Search, which create the APPS-RGPD dataset, 
we retrieved the fields: actor_identity_id, actor, action_query_phone, ts, and object.  
With these fields, a data frame was created (a type of table from the pandas3 library, 
in python, very useful for machine learning) with every actor identity id. In some logs 
there is not identity id associated with the user. In those situations, the identity id was 
replaced with the actor. The field of the data frame with all the identity ids was also called 
Actor_identity_id. Then for each identity id, we went to the logs obtained and counted 
how many telephone numbers they had accessed. That field in the data frame is called 
Action_query_phones. Another interesting field was the number of days a user made 
accesses, for that the ts APPS-RGPD dataset field was used. For each access a user made, 
the date was checked, and it was counted in how many different days he had accessed a 
telephone number. The field was named Days. An obvious field to consider was the total 
amount of times a user made an access (field named Count in the data frame), it was 
simply to count how many times the id (or actor) appeared in the APPS-RGPD dataset. 
One more field was the number of different applications each user used. For each user we 
counted how many different applications that identity had in the logs object field. Finally, 
since this data frame was created for future applications of machine learning, the relations 
between these fields were also relevant. The ratio between the most significant behavior 
characteristics gave rise to three different fields: Ratio_Access/Tel/Days, 
Ratio_Access/Tel and Ratio_Access/Days. Table 2 describes each field of the dataset 
created for this approach. 
 
                                                 
3 https://pandas.pydata.org/ 
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 Table 2-Features of the dataset created for users approach 
 
Perspectives 
To find different and specific kinds of anomalies, the algorithms were applied in 
different combinations of the created dataset features. This allows behaviors that could 
pass unnoticed when looking at all the features together. For example, a combination 
between the number of accesses made by the user and the number of telephone numbers 
the user accessed, will detect anomalies always focusing on these features, but when using 
Actor_identity_id 
        A unique, random, anonymized user identifier. Each user is identified 
by his identification number, in the cases this number does not exist, the 
user name will be used (actor). 
 
Counts 
Total number of accesses made by the user. 
 
Action_query_phones 
Number of telephone numbers the user accessed. 
 
Objects 
Number of applications the user used to access the telephone 
numbers. 
 
Days 
Number of different days in which the user made an access. 
 
Ratio_Access/Tel/Days 
Ratio between the total number of accesses of the user, the number 
of telephone numbers accessed by the user and the number of days in 
which the user made accesses. 
 
Ratio_Access/Tel 
Ratio between the total number of accesses of the user and the 
number of telephone numbers accessed by the user. 
 
Ratio_Access/Days 
Ratio between the total number of accesses of the user and the 
number of days in which the user made accesses. 
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the entire dataset, if a user has these features somewhat out of the pattern but all the others 
are “normal” there is a higher chance that the anomaly will pass unnoticed. Table 3 
describes the different perspectives analyzed. 
 
Table 3- Different perspectives to study in users approach 
AccessTel 
Total number of accesses made by the user and the number of 
telephone numbers the user accessed. 
AccessDay 
Total number of accesses made by the user and the number of 
different days in which the user made an access. 
TelDay 
The number of telephone numbers the user accessed and the 
number of different days in which the user made an access. 
Ratios The three ratios created based on the other features. 
All All the features are considered. 
 
 
3.2.2  Telephones approach 
The telephones approach is focused on the telephone numbers. The objective of this 
approach is to detect the telephone numbers that have abnormal behavior. Then select the 
users that have accessed those telephone numbers and verify if these have abnormal 
nature. Once again, from the logs obtained from Elastic Search, which create the APPS-
RGPD dataset, we retrieved the same fields: actor_identity_id, actor, 
action_query_phone, ts, and object. The difference came in the way these fields were 
used to create the new dataset.  
A new dataframe was created, this one with every telephone number. Then it was 
counted, from the logs of accesses, how many different users had accessed each telephone 
number. This field was called Actors. The field Days was created again, but this time, for 
each time a telephone number was accessed, the date was checked and it was counted 
how many different days each telephone number was accessed. Another field that was 
also created was Count, the total number of times a telephone number was accessed. It 
was as simple as counting the number of times a telephone number appeared in the access 
logs. The field Objects in the dataframe means the number of different applications each 
telephone number was accessed by. For each telephone number, it was counted how many 
different applications had been used by users in the logs object field. Finally, just like in 
the users approach, the relations between these fields were also relevant. The ratio 
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between the most significant behavior characteristics gave rise to the three different 
fields: Ratio_Access/Actor/Days, Ratio_Access/Actor and Ratio_Access/Days. Table 4 
describes each field of the dataset created for this approach. 
 
Table 4--Features of the dataset created for telephones approach 
Action_query_phone 
The telephone number. 
 
Count 
Number of times that telephone number was accessed. 
 
Actors 
Number of users that accessed that telephone number. 
 
Object 
Number of applications users used to access that telephone 
number. 
 
Days 
Number of different days in which the telephone number was 
accessed. 
 
Ratio_Access/Actor/Day 
Ratio between the total number of times the telephone number 
was accessed, the number of users that accessed the telephone 
number and the number of days in which the telephone number was 
accessed. 
 
Ratio_Access/Actor 
Ratio between the total number of accesses of the user and the 
number of telephone numbers accessed by the user. 
 
Ratio_Access/Days 
Ratio between the total number of times the telephone number 
was accessed and the number of days in which the telephone 
number was accessed. 
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Perspectives 
Just like for the users approach, we need to look at different perspectives of the 
dataset to detect the different types of anomalies. These are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5- Different perspectives to study in telephones approach 
AccessActor 
Total number of times a telephone number 
was accessed and the number of users that 
accessed it. 
AccessDay 
Total number of times a telephone number 
was accessed and the number of different days 
in which it was accessed. 
DayActor 
The number of different days in which the 
telephone number was accessed and the 
number of users that accessed it. 
Ratios 
The three ratios created based on the other 
features. 
All All the features are considered. 
 
3.2.3  Normalization 
. Like in most machine learning situations, since we are dealing with features with 
very different intervals, the data needs to be normalized. Since, this data has “noise” (the 
data contains anomalies that are not supposed to be considered in the normal interval of 
each feature), instead of using the maximum and minimum number of a feature, we 
decided to use the 3rd quartile (75th quantile) and 1st quartile (25th quantile), 
respectively, therefore instead of the median we scale the data according to the quantile 
range. This means that Robust Scaler was the normalization method chosen. 
3.3  Anomalies 
 
Both datasets will be explored in various ways, to detect specific types of anomalies 
with the different algorithms. The types of anomalies considered are described in Table 
6. 
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Table 6- Labels created to classify anomalies 
1st type of anomaly 
Many accesses to many telephone numbers, in 
many days 
2nd type of anomaly 
Many accesses to some telephone numbers, in 
many days 
3rd type of anomaly 
Many accesses to one or few telephone 
numbers, in many days 
4th type of anomaly 
Many accesses to many telephone numbers, in 
one or few days 
5th type of anomaly 
Many accesses to some telephone numbers, in 
one or few days 
6th type of anomaly 
Many accesses to one or a few telephone 
numbers, in one or few days 
7th type of anomaly 
Many accesses to a telephone number, just one 
day 
8th type of anomaly 
Some accesses to a telephone number, just one 
day 
9th type of anomaly 
Some accesses to one or a few telephone 
numbers, in one or few days 
10th type of anomaly Extreme cases (obvious anomalies) 
 
All of these types could be relevant depending on the specific situation looked for. 
The 3rd, 4th and 7th type of anomaly are the ones that represent the most pertinent situations looked 
for. The 3rd type of anomaly could be a case of stalking or tracking. Someone is following 
the activity of a certain telephone for a long period. The 4th type represents a massive 
extraction of information of various telephone numbers in a short period. This could mean 
that someone is performing a fast search to raise clients for another telecommunications 
company. The 7th type, a massive extraction of information of a telephone number in a 
short period. This could mean, for example, someone is searching for some specific 
information about a telephone number. All these situations are examples of very relevant 
cases this project intends to detect. Even though the other ones are not as much of a 
priority, they could also represent relevant cases. The 8th type of anomaly, for example, 
could be a situation of someone searching for a telephone number because a friend from 
the outside of the company asked for. The same goes for the 9th anomaly type, but in this 
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case, instead of one, the person would be searching in two or three telephone numbers. 
The 10th type is very likely a test account due to its behavior numbers being so high.  
Succinctly, all the types could represent a relevant situation of illicit accesses to clients 
telephone numbers information, but a few types have priority, due to its specificity 
towards what we are looking for. 
3.4  Algorithms 
 
When it came to choosing the algorithms that were going to be used we tried to 
diversify. Both clustering and anomaly detection algorithms were taken into 
consideration. Anomaly detection algorithms to serve their purpose and clustering 
algorithms to divide the data in a way that it is possible to interpret the separation of the 
anomalies from the users that follow the pattern, meaning that bigger clusters represent 
identities that follow the pattern, and very small and more distant clusters represent 
identities having an “abnormal” behavior. In the case of DBSCAN, not only it returns 
clusters but also the identities that do not fit any cluster. These identities will also be 
interpreted as anomalies. K-means and DBSCAN were considered because they are two 
different general purpose clustering methods, affinity propagation was used because it 
has the ability to determine the number of clusters without specific parameters.  
3.4.1  K-means 
One of the algorithms used was K-means4. Since it is the most known and tested 
clustering algorithm it was relevant to take it into account. Since in the beginning the 
important is to start understanding the data and try different things, we started by it. Even 
though it is the most known and very simple clustering algorithm it can obtain very good 
results as seen in “A survey of network anomaly detection techniques” [5]. 
The most important parameter in this algorithm is the number of clusters chosen. 
This was the parameter that had to be optimized.  
Parameters used: 
 
 N_clusters: The number of clusters to form (To be decided in the parameterization 
step); 
 Init: Method for initialization (‘k-means++’, selects initial cluster centers for k-
means clustering in a smart way to speed up convergence); 
                                                 
4 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.cluster.KMeans.html 
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 N_init: Number of time the k-means algorithm will be run with different centroid 
seeds. The final results will be the best output of n_init consecutive runs in terms of 
inertia (10); 
 Max_iter: Maximum number of iterations of the k-means algorithm for a single 
run. 7000 would be the number chosen for more rigorous results, but after trying it, 
the results remained equally good and the execution time increased a lot, so it did 
not compensate (3000); 
 Tol: Relative tolerance with regards to inertia to declare convergence(1e-4); 
 N_jobs: The number of parallel jobs to run (-1, means using all processors). 
3.4.2  DBSCAN 
In DBSCAN5, we do not have to select a number of clusters directly. It has two other 
important parameters, the minimal distance between points and the minimal number of 
neighbors a point has to have to not be considered noise. As mentioned in “The Anomaly 
Detection by Using DBSCAN Clustering with Multiple Parameters” [11], DBSCAN 
performance can be very good compared to other algorithms, with the right 
parameterization applied.  
Parameters used: 
 
 Eps: The maximum distance between two samples for one to be considered 
as in the neighborhood of the other (to be decided in the parameterization 
step); 
 Min_samples: The number of samples in a neighborhood for a point to be 
considered as a core point (to be decided in the parameterization step); 
 Algorithm: The algorithm to be used by the NearestNeighbors module to 
compute pointwise distances and find nearest neighbors (‘auto’, the 
algorithm attempts to determine the best approach from the training data); 
 N_jobs: The number of parallel jobs to run (-1, means using all processors). 
 
 
                                                 
5 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.cluster.DBSCAN.html 
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3.4.3  Affinity Propagation 
Affinity Propagation6 is an interesting algorithm to use since it calculates the number 
of clusters alone. There were still a few parameters that needed to be refined, the number 
of iterations to converge, the maximum number of iterations and the preference for each 
point. It acquired great clustering results in “Smart Audio Sensors in the Internet of 
Things Edge for Anomaly Detection” [10], especially with its ability to determine the 
number of clusters the data should be divided in.  
Parameters used: 
 
 Damping: Damping factor is the extent to which the current value is 
maintained relative to incoming values (0.5); 
 Max_iter: Maximum number of iterations (7000); 
 Convergence_iter: Number of iterations with no change in the number of 
estimated clusters that stops the convergence (to be decided in 
parameterization step); 
 Preference: Preferences for each point. Points with larger values of 
preferences are more likely to be chosen as exemplars (the negative value of 
the maximum distance between points, this was chosen to reduce the number 
of points as exemplars, reducing the number of clusters created); 
 Affinity: Which affinity to use (‘euclidean’, uses the negative squared 
euclidean distance between points). 
3.4.4  Elliptic Envelope 
Another type of algorithms to try were anomaly detection algorithms. Unlike 
clustering algorithms, the results obtained in these are the points considered anomalies, 
with no need for an interpretation of the results to take the smallest clusters as the 
anomalies. The main parameter in Elliptic Envelope7 is the amount of contamination. 
According to “Smart Audio Sensors in the Internet of Things Edge for Anomaly 
Detection” [12] results and methodology, elliptic envelope algorithm was expected to 
deliver a good contribution to the final results. 
Parameters used: 
 
                                                 
6 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.cluster.AffinityPropagation.html 
7 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.covariance.EllipticEnvelope.html 
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 Store_precision: Specify if the estimated precision is stored (true); 
 Support_fraction: The proportion of points to be included in the support of 
the raw MCD (Minimum covariance determinant) estimate; 
 Contamination: The amount of contamination of the data set, which means 
the proportion of outliers in the data set (to be decided in the parameterization 
step); 
 Random_state: The seed of the pseudo-random number generator to use 
when shuffling the data (‘None’, the random number generator is the 
RandomState instance used by np.random). 
 
3.4.5  Isolation Forest 
For the same reasons given for elliptic envelope, another anomaly detection 
algorithm considered was Isolation Forest8. This algorithm also has the contamination 
parameter as its most important influencer in the results. “Smart Audio Sensors in the 
Internet of Things Edge for Anomaly Detection” [12] also relates isolation forest as a 
relevant contribution to the final results.  
Parameters used: 
 
 Max_samples: The number of samples to draw from X to train each base 
estimator (10000 for users approach and 100000 for telephones approach); 
 Contamination: The amount of contamination of the data set, which 
means the proportion of outliers in the data set (to be decided in the 
parameterization step); 
 Max_features: The number of features to draw from X to train each base 
estimator (the number of features of the dataset in which the algorithm is 
applied); 
 Random_state: The seed of the pseudo-random number generator to use 
when shuffling the data (‘None’, the random number generator is the 
RandomState instance used by np.random); 
                                                 
8 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.ensemble.IsolationForest.html 
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 N_jobs: The number of parallel jobs to run (-1, means using all 
processors); 
3.5  Parameterization 
 
As mentioned before, in each approach, the five algorithms were applied to each 
feature combination. Score tables were created for each case according to the 
methodology shown in Figure 16, which depicts the columns in each table. The results 
were then used to select suitable parameters for each method and perspective. 
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Figure 16- Explanation of score tables created for the parameterization optimization 
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The first column, or two first columns in the case of DBSCAN, in a score table are 
related to the method parameters being optimized. Then we have the number of clusters 
formed with that parameter (in the case of K-means the parameter itself is the number of 
clusters), the number of anomalies detected and the evaluation metrics, silhouette score 
and VRC. Then, there is the percentage that the detected anomalies cover from a list with 
103 identities, already analyzed and confirmed as having suspicious behavior (this list 
contains known abnormal cases that have been approved as having suspicious behavior 
but does not contain, by far, all the anomalies existent), and, finally, the ratio between 
that percentage and the number of anomalies. 
These score tables are referenced to users, therefore in the process of choosing the 
best parameterization for the telephones approach (in order to telephone numbers), the 
results obtained in each algorithm with the respective parameters are converted to the user 
approach. The conversion process is, as explained before, the telephones approach detects 
the telephone numbers that have abnormal behavior, and then the users that have accessed 
those telephone numbers are selected and considered the anomalies. 
This project has the intention to help the company detect users and the type of illicit 
actions they are undertaking, so the process should be implemented periodically. Even 
though it is not established if it would be once a week, once a month, or even once every 
2 or 3 months, the process should be minimally fast. The aggregated dataset for the 
telephone approach is much larger than the user dataset. For that reason, for the users 
approach 5 algorithms were applied, but for the telephones approach, the affinity 
propagation and DBSCAN algorithms weren't considered, due to their high time and 
space complexity. 
In summary, the parameters being optimized and the values considered for each 
algorithm, are presented in Table 7. 
Each parameter varied between a certain range of values: 
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Table 7- Parameterization range tested 
Algorithm Parameter Interval 
Isolation 
Forest 
contamination 
[0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.08, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 
0.30, 0.35, 0.40] 
K-means 
number of 
clusters 
[2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,15,16,18,20,25,30,35,40,45,
50,60,70,100,150] 
DBSCAN mindist 
[0.1,0.5,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,15,16,18,20,25,30,
35,40,45,50,60,70,100,150] 
DBSCAN minPoints 
[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,15,16,18,20,25,30,35,40,4
5,50,60,70,100,150] 
Affinity 
Propagation 
convergence 
[1,5,10,50,80,100,150,200,250,300,350,400,450,500,
550,600,700,750,800,850,900,950,1000] 
Elliptic 
Envelope 
contamination 
[0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.08, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 
0.30, 0.35, 0.40] 
 
For a better evaluation and consistency of the results with the different parameters, 
the algorithms with random initialization were executed 10 times for each 
parameterization and the values on the scores are the mean of the results of the 10 
executions. An algorithm with random initialization means that depending on the 
initialization that occurs, results may vary. In terms of K-means, for example, it means 
that initially all samples are assigned with a cluster label. Elliptic Envelope and Isolation 
Forest are the other two algorithms with random initialization. 
Both clustering and anomaly detection algorithms were used, therefore a way to 
evaluate them similarly, to be possible to compare, was necessary. Silhouette score and 
VRC are clustering evaluation metrics, they are applied to a vector with the cluster label 
for each sample. The anomaly detection algorithms used, return a vector that can be 
interpreted as a clustering result with only two clusters. The anomalies are labeled as “-
1” and the rest of the data labeled as “1”. So, these evaluations metrics were used for both 
the clustering and anomaly detection algorithms.  
As explained before, silhouette score calculates the silhouette coefficient for all 
samples and then returns the mean of these coefficients. To calculate that coefficient it 
has to calculate distances between all points. It was expected that the execution time 
applied to the data of the users approach and the data of the telephones approach would 
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be very different. With the telephones data, the time complexity was very high. After 
researching for ways to solve this problem, the one considered best was to use a sample 
of the data for the evaluation. Different sample sizes were tested to see the best way to 
find a time and accuracy balance, in other words, a way to have enough data to give a 
realistic idea but that also takes a reasonable amount of time to execute. The sample size 
used was 10000, which means that only 10000 random samples were used to evaluate an 
algorithm. Had this happened in the users approach, this solution would not have been as 
reliable, but since the three algorithms applied to the telephones approach all have random 
initialization, the silhouette score was calculated 10 times in all of them. Thus, the 
silhouette score that appears in each table score is the mean of 10 times the silhouette 
score was applied, which means, that 10000 random samples were chosen 10 times for 
the evaluation. This gives a possibility of up to 100000 different samples to be used.  
One more problem encountered was a situation in which an algorithm applied to a 
determined perspective did not find any anomalies, it considered all samples similar to 
each other. This was a problem because for both silhouette score and VRC to work they 
need at least two clusters. To solve this problem, since it was only encountered in a 
situation in which the algorithm had to run 10 times, and out of 10 times, the problem 
only happened at most two times, the silhouette score and VRC did not run for these 
cases. This means that out of the 10 times the algorithm was applied, if no anomalies were 
found one time, the silhouette score and VRC in score table would be the mean of nine 
times they run. The score tables in the appendices that had this problem are marked.   
To make the best parameterization decision for the users approach we had in mind 
the following factors, considering also previous knowledge on the anomalies: 
o Silhouette Score must be higher than 0,70 (to consider only the cases in which 
the points firmly belong to the clusters);  
o VRC has to be larger than 100 (the VRC must be high to have knowledge 
that we are working with an optimal number of clusters, after looking to the 
variances of its value on the different score tables, this was the value 
considered to be the minimum acceptable);  
o Number of anomalies has to be larger than 10 (if less than 10 we would 
always obtain the ten most obvious anomalies which would not contribute to 
the objective of discovering new anomalies); 
o Number of anomalies has to be smaller than 300 (if there are more, there is a 
big probability of considering higher proportions of false positives as 
anomalies); 
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o The PercentConfirmed should be the highest possible with the highest 
RatioPercentAnomalies possible. 
Since the size of the dataset for the telephone numbers is much higher than the 
number of users the same rules could not be applied. 
To make the best parameterization decision for the telephones approach we took into 
account the following factors, considering also previous knowledge on the anomalies: 
o Silhouette Score must be higher than 0,70 (to consider only the cases in which 
the points firmly belong to the clusters);  
o VRC has to be larger than 100 (the VRC must be high to have knowledge 
that we are working with an optimal number of clusters, after looking to the 
variances of its value on the different score tables, this was the value 
considered to be the minimum acceptable); 
o Number of anomalies has to be smaller than 2000 (With this amount there is 
possibly already a high number of false positives, but this could be accepted 
since there were no results with options for the users approach limits 
imposed, and since this factor was taken into account in the posterior steps); 
o The RatioPercentAnomalies should be the highest possible with the highest 
PercentConfirmed possible. (In this situation the PercentConfirmed value 
was not as relevant as in the users approach since the variance in the number 
of anomalies is so high that the little (in comparison) amount of 
PercentConfirmed coverage does not bring so much information. 
3.6  Ensemble 
The ensemble step is where the results of all algorithms, in all perspectives, are 
combined. The objective of this step is to find the most trustworthy way to combine all 
the different algorithm results and extract the best decisions from it. 
To decide which was the best ensemble method, three approaches were taken into 
account. 
 
 UnionUnion: Union of the results obtained in each algorithm for a feature 
combination, with the posterior union of the results obtained in all the 
perspectives; 
 IntersectUnion: Intersection of the results obtained in each algorithm for a 
feature combination (an anomaly is only considered if it was obtained in all 
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the algorithms when applied to a certain feature combination), with the 
posterior union of the results obtained in all the perspectives; 
 VotingUnion: Vote method, an anomaly is only considered if it was obtained 
in the majority (3 in the users approach and 2 in the telephones approach) of 
the algorithms applied to a certain feature combination, with the posterior 
union of the results obtained in all the perspectives. 
3.7  Classification 
 
At the end of the process, when we have the anomalies obtained, it is necessary to 
label each of them in one of the anomaly types previously defined. An anomaly can 
correspond to more than a type, but all of them need to belong to at least one. This was 
done through decision rules, where each anomaly was compared to each type conditions, 
and labelled to the types it belonged. After studying the data and a team process to define 
specific illicit situations to consider, rules and limits were created for each of the 
situations characterization. 
Table 8 shows which were the conditions that made an anomaly belong to each type. 
 
Table 8- Rules followed to distinguish the anomaly labels created 
 Number of accesses Number of days it 
made accesses  
Number of telephone 
numbers it accessed 
Type 1 >100 > 30 > 50 
Type 2 >100 > 30 <= 50 
Type 3 >100 > 30 <= 10 
Type 4 >100 <= 30 > 50 
Type 5 >100 <= 30 <= 50 
Type 6 >40 <= 30 <= 10 
Type 7 >= 20 == 1 == 1 
Type 8 < 20 == 1 == 1 
Type 9 < 40 <= 30 <= 10 
Type 10 >10000 > 150 > 1000 
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3.8  Process Automation 
 
All the different methodology steps were done in different jupyter notebooks. The 
final step would be to aggregate all of them in a single python process. But, with the 
different steps in different notebooks, with jupyter web interface, error solving becomes 
a much easier task, because each step is in a different jupyter notebook facilitating errors 
search. Therefore the final idea was to leave all the steps isolated but write the process in 
a shell script that would run all the notebooks in the right order. The process architecture 
is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
The pre-processing is the first part to run to prepare the data. Both approaches run in 
parallel. The perspective and decision steps wait until pre-processing is finished because 
they need the results to continue. Then, all the different perspectives run in parallel. After 
all the decisions in the different perspectives are done, their results are used in the 
ensemble. Finally, the notebook responsible for anomaly classification runs and is 
responsible for the final results, ending the process. 
  
Figure 17- Automation process architecture 
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Chapter 4 Results 
All the parameterization results related to the execution of the methodology 
presented in section 3.5 (Figure 16), are presented in appendices B to F (users approach) 
and G to K (telephones approach). Appendix A shows abbreviations used in the results 
tables. 
4.1  User Approach 
Following the rules created to choose the best parameterization, we obtained the best 
parameters for each <algorithm, feature perspective> pair, presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9-Users approach parameterization results 
 AccessTel AccessDay TelDay Ratios All 
Isolation Forest 
(percentage of 
contamination) 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
K-means (number of 
clusters) 
6 7 4 8 9 
DBSCAN {mindist, 
minPoints} 
{1,35} {1,150} {0.5,35} {3,45} {3,4} 
Affinity Propagation 
(convergence) 
5 10 --- 10 10 
Elliptic Envelope 
(percentage of 
contamination) 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
With the optimal parameterization, the algorithms were applied to each of the five 
different feature perspectives. For the results of every application, an overall human 
analysis was performed to see if we were dealing with cases of possible anomalies or if 
there was a significant percentage of false positives. The outcome was positive since the 
anomalies found, that were studied in detail, had a suspicious behavior that fit at least one 
of the anomalies types defined. Since it is a human analysis, it has to be taken into account 
that it does not give us total certainty.  
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The affinity propagation applied to the TelDay perspective returned thousands of 
clusters for all the different parameterization tried, so this combination was not used for 
the final results.  
To better understand the users detected by each algorithm, plots based on each 
perspective features were created. All plots had, the already known, test users removed 
for better visualization and interpretation. The red points are all the users and the blue 
points are the anomalies detected. 
Perspective AccessDay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18- Anomalies detected by DBSCAN 
Figure 22-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest 
Figure 19 -Anomalies detected by K-means 
Figure 21-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope Figure 20-Anomalies detected by Affinity 
propagation 
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Table 10-Comparison of results of the different algorithms in AccessDay perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 2.912 0.044 
K-means 0.971 0.065 
DBSCAN 12.621 0.070 
Affinity Propagation 0 --- 
Elliptic Envelope 5.825 0.088 
 
Looking at the different plots of figures 18 to 22 it is possible to predict that 
DBSCAN detects the biggest amount of users out of the pattern (probably correct 
anomalies). Affinity propagation it is probably the one that not only detects the least, but 
also the least important ones. When observing Table 10 it is possible to see that DBSCAN 
has the most coverage over the list with 100 identities and the highest ratio between the 
number of anomalies and the percentage coverage, this means that there is a good balance 
between the number of anomalies detected and the confirmed anomalies coverage, with 
attention to the fact that the list containing 100 identities is just used as a guide since the 
100 identities are not all the anomalies existent, neither the most important, it is just a list 
in which there is knowledge of identities confirmed as anomaly situations. 
Perspective AccessTel 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope Figure 23-Anomalies detected by DBSCAN 
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Table 11-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in AccessTel perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 4.854 0.076 
K-means 1.941 0.050 
DBSCAN 12.621 0.070 
Affinity Propagation 2.912 0.073 
Elliptic Envelope 8.738 0.132 
 
In this perspective, as it can be seen in figures 23 to 27, all algorithms seem to do a 
good job of detecting the most important anomalies. Isolation forest is probably the one 
that is the least suitable for this perspective, detecting not only the least but also some that 
maybe are not reliable. Table 11 shows that DBSCAN is the algorithm with the highest 
coverage over the confirmed anomalies, it does not have the highest ratio between the 
number of anomalies and the percentage coverage, but that is due to the fact that 
DBSCAN has the highest number of anomalies detected. Even though the number of 
anomalies being higher helps it to have a higher confirmed anomalies coverage, if we 
look at the balance between the two, and at the plots, it is possible to conclude DBSCAN 
is the best algorithm in this perspective. 
Figure 27-Anomalies detected by K-means 
Figure 26-Anomalies detected by Affinity 
Propagation 
Figure 25-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest 
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Perspective TelDay 
 
 
Table 12-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in TelDay perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 5.825 0.090 
K-means 5.825 0.037 
DBSCAN 10.679 0.065 
Elliptic Envelope 1.942 0.029 
 
In the TelDay perspective all algorithms seem to behave very well, the only 
difference comes in quantities of anomalies detected, being DBSCAN the one that detects 
the most and Elliptic Envelope the one that detects the least (see figures 28 to 31). As 
shown in  
Table 12, DBSCAN, once again, has the highest coverage over the confirmed 
anomalies but Isolation Forest has a much higher ratio between the number of anomalies 
and the percentage coverage, this means that even though DBSCAN detects more 
anomalies, Isolation Forest anomalies could be more pertinent. 
Figure 28-Anomalies detected by K-means Figure 29-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope 
Figure 31-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest Figure 30-Anomalies detected by DBSCAN 
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Perspective Ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X-Axis: Access/Tel Y-Axis: Access/Tel/Days Z-Axis: Access/Days 
Figure 32-Anomalies detected by DBSCAN 
Figure 35-Anomalies detected by K-means 
Figure 33-Anomalies detected by Affinity Propagation 
Figure 34-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope 
Figure 36-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest 
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Table 13-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in Ratios perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 12.621 0.200 
K-means 20.388 0.143 
DBSCAN 24.272 0.145 
Affinity Propagation 13.592 0.468 
Elliptic Envelope 12.621 0.178 
 
K-means, Elliptic Envelope, and Isolation Forest seem the most appropriate 
algorithms for this perspective (figures 32 to 36). Affinity propagation seems to detect 
right but very few anomalies. DBSCAN detects too many, it detects the important ones 
but probably it also detects some that are not that reliable. DBSCAN has the highest 
confirmed anomalies coverage but it has a low ratio between coverage percentage and 
number of anomalies, this is due to the fact that it detects so many anomalies. Affinity 
propagation has a very high ratio due to the opposite, it detects very few anomalies. 
Isolation Forest seems to have the best balance. 
Perspective All 
Since it is not possible to visualize all seven features, PCA was applied, so the results 
are harder to interpret. PCA is a dimensionality reduction algorithm that uses linear 
algebra to transform the dataset into a “compressed” form. A property of PCA is that we 
may choose the number of dimensions or principal components in the transformed result. 
This allows to simplify work when dealing with high dimensionality data. To apply PCA 
the data had to be normalized before. 
 
 
Figure 37-Anomalies detected by DBSCAN Figure 38-Anomalies detected by Affinity Propagation 
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Table 14-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in All perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 11.650 0.177 
K-means 13.592 0.453 
DBSCAN 27.184 0.165 
Affinity Propagation 13.592 0.082 
Elliptic Envelope 7.767 0.118 
 
Looking at the plots in figures 37 to 41, it seems that Elliptic Envelope may be the 
most reliable algorithm for this perspective, but certainty will only be acquired when 
looking at the final results. When looking at Table 14, K-means seems to have the most 
reliable results, it has a high confirmed anomalies coverage even though it detects fewer 
anomalies. Once again, DBSCAN has the highest confirmed anomalies coverage. 
 
Figure 39-Anomalies detected by K-means Figure 40-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope 
Figure 41-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest 
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Overall Results 
 
Table 15-Number of anomalies obtained for each algorithm applied to each perspective in users approach 
Number of 
anomalies 
AccessTel AccessDay TelDay Ratios All 
Isolation Forest 63 56 66 64 65 
K-means 134 15 159 138 30 
DBSCAN 198 179 164 167 165 
Affinity 
Propagation 
310 5 --- 29 28 
Elliptic Envelope 66 66 66 66 66 
 
The final results differ a lot depending on the ensemble approach chosen. As 
demonstrated by the resuls in Table 16 and Table 17, wich are a summary of part of the 
results presented in Appendix L – Final Results. With a UnionUnion ensemble execution, 
a very high number of anomalies was found, that covered many of the anomalies already 
confirmed as illicit, and there is a high number of anomalies in each of the classification 
types. Even though this could seem like good results, the high percentage cover of the 
confirmed anomalies and the abundance in the different anomaly types happens only 
because of the high amount of anomalies obtained. If the UnionUnion approach was 
chosen there would be a high probability of false positives.  
With an IntersectionUnion approach, we deal with the opposite, since to be 
considered an anomaly, the user would have to be detected by all algorithms, we are 
leaving behind a lot of possible illicit situations. A very low number of anomalies is 
obtained and only the most obvious classification types are being detected. This situation 
completely avoids false positives but in exchange, it does not detect all the relevant 
anomalies neither has a wide variety of anomaly types. If the IntersectUnion approach 
was chosen there would be a high probability of false negatives. 
Finally, with the VotingUnion, we have a reasonable number of anomalies that 
covers, a good percentage of the confirmed anomalies and all the distinct classifications. 
Since each anomaly went to a process of voting, in which only the ones that were detected 
by the majority of algorithms were considered, the probability of existence of false 
positives is being strongly reduced. 
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Table 16-Comparison of results of the different ensemble methods in users approach 
 UnionUnion IntersectUnion VotingUnion 
Number of 
Anomalies 
obtained 
556 59 219 
Percentage 
coverage of 
confirmed 
anomalies  
69% 33% 53% 
 
 
Table 17- Anomaly types detected in each ensemble method, in users approach 
 
After choosing the Voting Union as the best ensemble method and observing its final 
results (in Appendix L), it was interesting to see which algorithms contributed the most. 
Table 18 shows us how many of the final anomalies we detected by each algorithm. 
 
Table 18- Comparison of different algorithms detection of final anomalies in users approach 
Algorithms  Final Anomalies detected 
Isolation Forest 123 
K-means 207 
DBSCAN 219 
Affinity Propagation 179 
Elliptic Envelope 156 
 
 
Number of 
Anomalies 
T. 1 T. 2 T. 3 T. 4 T. 5 T. 6 T. 7 T. 8 T. 9 T. 10 
UnionUnion 357 32 12 18 30 33 4 39 88 150 
IntersectUnion 38 9 4 2 3 6 0 0 0 35 
VotingUnion 142 16 8 6 11 17 2 21 32 114 
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4.2  Telephone Approach 
 
Once again, the rules created to choose the best parameterization were followed and 
the best parameters for each <algorithm, feature perspective> pair were obtained: 
 
 
Since we’re dealing with a much larger dataset and the rules for the telephones 
approach had to allow more anomalies, as expected, the amount of anomalies each 
algorithm detects for each perspective is higher. 
Just like the score tables, when an algorithm runs in the telephone approach the 
results are converted to the user approach, this means that the results presented refer to 
the users considered anomalies due to being responsible for the telephones that were 
considered anomalies by the application of the algorithms on the telephones approach 
dataset. 
Like in the users approach, to better understand the users detected by each algorithm, 
plots based on each perspective features were created. Once again, all the plots had the 
already known test users removed for better visualization and interpretation. Following 
the same idea, the red points correspond to all the users existent and the blue points to the 
anomalies detected. 
Table 19-Telephones approach parameterization results 
 AccessActor AccessDay DayActor Ratios All 
Isolation Forest 
(percentage of 
contamination) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.001 
K-means (number of 
clusters) 
5 5 2 5 6 
Elliptic Envelope 
(percentage of 
contamination) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.05 0.001 
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Perspective AccessDay   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in AccessDay perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 26.213 0.067 
K-means 31.067 0.194 
Elliptic Envelope 26.213 0.067 
 
 
Figure 43-Anomalies detected by K-means Figure 42-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope 
Figure 44-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest 
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Perspective AccessActor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in AccessActor perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 26.213 0.046 
K-means 20.388 0.184 
Elliptic Envelope 26.213 0.066 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope 
Figure 45-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest Figure 46-Anomalies detected by K-means 
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Perspective DayActor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in DayActor perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 27.184 0.065 
K-means 18.446 0.200 
Elliptic Envelope 29.126 0.077 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48-Anomalies detected by K-means 
Figure 50-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope 
Figure 49-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest 
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Perspective Ratios 
 
 
X-Axis: Access/Actor Y-Axis: Access/Actor/Days Z-Axis: Access/Days 
 
Table 23-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in Ratios perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 37.864 0.019 
K-means 17.476 0.196 
Elliptic Envelope 37.864 0.029 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53-Anomalies detected by K-means 
Figure 52-Anomalies detected by Isolation 
Forest 
Figure 51-Anomalies detected by Elliptic 
Envelope 
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Perspective All 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24-Comparison of the results of the different algorithms in All perspective 
Algorithm PercentConfirmed RatioPercentAnomalies 
Isolation Forest 35.922 0.096 
K-means 29.126 0.310 
Elliptic Envelope 56.311 0.157 
 
The results are visibly less reliable than in the users approach. The decisions to 
ensemble the results have to be much stricter to avoid false positives. It is necessary to 
have in consideration that the idea with the telephones approach was to detect the 
anomalies not detected by the users approach, so it was expected that the anomalies 
detected would not be in the same obvious area. The confirmed anomalies percentage is 
higher than in the users approach but that is due to the number of anomalies detected in 
the telephones approach being much higher. 
Figure 56-Anomalies detected by K-means 
Figure 54-Anomalies detected by Elliptic Envelope Figure 55-Anomalies detected by Isolation Forest 
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Overall Results 
 
Table 25-Number of anomalies obtained for each algorithm applied to each perspective in telephones approach 
Number of 
anomalies 
AccessActor AccessDay DayActor Ratios All 
Isolation Forest 432 373 431 1272 346 
K-means 142 160 92 89 94 
Elliptic Envelope 393 393 377 1218 339 
When choosing the best ensemble method for this approach we had to take into 
account that we’re dealing with a higher number of anomalies, and since false positives 
remains a concern the choice must be stricter. 
The UnionUnion ensemble method has 1547 anomalies, too many to have control 
over how many false positives may be in the final results, and, even though there are so 
many anomalies it only covers 43% of the confirmed anomalies, as shown in Table 26. 
The VotingUnion method also produces many anomalies and the percentage 
coverage of the confirmed anomalies does not compensate. This percentage could be 
ignored if we had confidence in the results, but in the users approach an anomaly being 
accepted meant it had appeared in three of the algorithms. Since in this approach only 
three algorithms were applied, the majority of the algorithms is just two, so for an 
anomaly to be accepted it only had to be detected by two of the algorithms. This does no 
t give enough security in terms of confidence in the results. 
The IntersectUnion method has much fewer anomalies and just like in the users 
approach all accepted anomalies have to be detected by all the algorithms applied. 
 
Table 26-Comparison of results of the different ensemble methods in telephones approach 
 UnionUnion IntersectUnion VotingUnion 
Number of 
Anomalies 
obtained 
1547 87 1087 
Percentage 
coverage of 
confirmed 
anomalies 
43% 22% 37% 
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 Table 27-Anomaly types detected in each ensemble method, in telephones approach 
 
In Table 27 it is possible to see that the UnionUnion detects the biggest number of 
anomalies in each type, it detects 1153 anomalies for type 1, which can not be considered 
reliable. VotingUnion also encounters the same problem, detecting 866 anomalies for the 
first type. Since it was established that in telephones approach we had to be stricter with 
the ensemble, IntersectUnion shows the most reliable results. 
Since the IntersectUnion was considered the best ensemble method all algorithms 
contributed the same, since an anomaly had to be detected by all of them. Table 28 
confirms that. 
 
Table 28-Comparison of different algorithms detection of final anomalies in telephones approach 
Algorithms  Final Anomalies detected 
Isolation Forest 87 
K-means 87 
Elliptic Envelope 87 
4.3  Final Results 
 
After executing both approaches the results were aggregated by union, meaning that 
if an identity was considered an anomaly at the end of an approach, it was also considered 
an anomaly in the final results. 
Tables 29, 30 and 31, show the number of anomalies from each anomaly type 
obtained, the number of anomalies obtained in both approaches and the final percentage 
coverage of confirmed anomalies. 
All types of anomalies are detected, being type 1 and type 10 the most common ones. 
Users approach detected more anomalies, which was expected since it was the main 
approach. The telephones approach was executed to complement the first one. Nineteen 
Number of 
Anomalies 
T. 1 T. 2 T. 3 T. 4 T. 5 T. 6 T. 7 T. 8 T. 9 T. 10 
UnionUnion 1153 67 8 49 84 18 0 6 47 87 
IntersectUnion 57 26 8 0 2 1 0 0 0 9 
VotingUnion 866 49 8 33 54 14 0 2 15 75 
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anomalies were detected by both approaches and the other 268 by only one of them (219 
by the users approach and 87 by the second).  
 
Table 29-Final anomaly types detected 
 
Table 30-Total anomalies obtained 
 
Final number of 
anomalies 
Anomalies from 
users approach 
Anomalies from 
telephones 
approach 
Anomalies 
detected in both 
approaches 
Number of 
Anomalies 
287 219 87 19 
 
The final results cover 64% of the list with confirmed anomalies, this means that the 
final results detected 65 of the 103 confirmed anomalies. The results from the Cuscos 
project covered 58%, which means that the project had detected 59 of the confirmed 
anomalies. Since 287 anomalies were detected, there are 222 to confirm. In the Cuscos 
project situation, because 1800 anomalies were detected, there would be 1741 anomalies 
to confirm. 
 
Table 31-Percentage coverage of confirmed anomalies 
Final results percentage coverage of confirmed 
anomalies 
Cuscos project results percentage coverage 
of confirmed anomalies 
64% 58% 
 
Finally, to illustrate the results, plots with the final anomalies in all the users 
perspectives were created, Figures 60 to 63. As referred before, the red points are all the 
users and the blue points are the anomalies detected. 
 T. 1 T. 2 T. 3 T. 4 T. 5 T. 6 T. 7 T. 8 T. 9 T. 10 
Number of 
Anomalies 
187 35 11 6 13 18 2 21 32 114 
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As it is possible to observe almost all the anomalies detected are in the less dense 
parts of the plots, which is great news since it means that they are the users that are not in 
the pattern. A few blue points appear in the dense parts, this could mean the existence of 
a false positive or that in a determined perspective that point follows the pattern because 
the feature that made it an anomaly is not present.  
Also to compare the results with the previous Cuscos project, the same plots were 
created but with the results of that project, as it is possible to see in Figures 64 to 67. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 58-Final anomalies detected viewed in 
AccessDay perspective 
Figure 59-Final anomalies detected viewed in 
TelDays perspective 
Figure 57-Final anomalies detected viewed in All 
perspective 
Figure 60-Final anomalies detected viewed in 
AccessTel perspective 
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This allows to see that the Cuscos project results must have too many false positives 
and that this problem was reduced in this project. It is also possible to see that Cuscos did 
not detect many of the users that are visibly off the pattern in the plots. 
 
Example 
To have a better idea of how this project results will be useful, an example will be 
shown below. Table 32 shows 4 anomalies from the final results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 64-Anomalies detected in Cuscos project 
viewed in TelDays perspective 
Figure 63-Anomalies detected in Cuscos project 
viewed in All perspective 
Figure 62-Anomalies detected in Cuscos project 
viewed in AccessTel perspective 
Figure 61-Anomalies detected in Cuscos project 
viewed in AccessDays perspective 
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Table 32- Example of 4 detected identities in final results 
1238 type4; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
188612 type10;  type4; All 
3018 type2; All 
32614 type1; All 
 
These four anomalies would be sent to an investigation process so that the necessary 
disciplinary or legal actions can be pursued. As mentioned before, the type 4 anomalies 
would be the priority because it represents a more specific situation that is considered 
very relevant. There is an anomaly from type 4 and 10, this means that even though it is 
representing the same situation, its behavior numbers are so high that is very likely to be 
a test account. Both anomalies from type 1 and 2 would be investigated after. Tables 33 
to 36 present the information related to each of the anomalies listed in Table 32. 
 
Table 33- Anomaly description 
Id Days Phones Objects Accesses 
1238 1 102 1 309 
As expected, the behavior in Table 33 seems to describe a situation of massive 
extraction of information of various telephones number in a short period. This type of 
anomaly is very important as it could mean that someone is performing a fast search to 
raise clients for another telecommunications company. 
 
Table 34- Anomaly description 
Id Days Phones Objects Accesses 
188612 25 5662 1 37530 
The behavior described in Table 34 confirms the possibility of this being a test 
account, and after investigating the situation it was possible to conclude that this is, in 
fact, a known test account. This is still a relevant result, as it would be a bad sign if these 
accounts went unnoticed. 
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Table 35- Anomaly description 
Id Days Phones Objects Accesses 
3018 112 38 1 3285 
 
 
Table 36- Anomaly description 
Id Days Phones Objects Accesses 
32614 108 980 3 6492 
Both the identities ‘3018’ and ‘32614’ behavior, described in Tables 35 and 36, also 
fits the type of anomaly they are classified as. Both could be justified as being someone 
from the financial department or some other acceptable reason, but could also be an illicit 
situation not being acknowledged, and for that reason, without priority, if there was not 
an acceptable justification, both would go through the investigation process. 
This example used just 4 of the 287 final anomalies just to give an idea of the results 
being put in practice and what the final goal was. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Work 
The goal of this project was to try a different approach from the Cuscos project to 
discover anomalies, find a way to label them in types, reduce the number of false positives 
and find new anomalies. We were able to identify many of the anomalies detected in the 
Cuscos project, some entirely new, differentiate the different types and greatly reduce the 
number of false positives. We believe that it was successful.  
In the users approach the best ensemble method, was the VotingUnion, since it 
covers more than half of the confirmed anomalies but also obtains others that were not 
caught before. It detects anomalies from the 10 different types but it does not have an 
unrealistic number of anomalies. Each anomaly has to be detected by the majority of the 
algorithms to be accepted, which decreases the probability of false positives. In terms of 
algorithms, from the final anomalies detected, DBSCAN is the one that detected the 
majority of them, detecting all 219 of them, in second place comes Kmeans, detecting 
207. Finally, Isolation Forest was the one that detected the least amount from the 
anomalies considered relevant after the VotingUnion Ensemble, with 123.  
In the telephones approach the best ensemble method was the IntersectUnion, since 
the numbers of anomalies were much higher and fewer algorithms were applied. To 
reduce false positives an anomaly had to be detected by all algorithms (just three were 
applied, so it’s the same amount of algorithms as in the ensemble method chosen in the 
users approach). It covers only 22% of the confirmed anomalies but since each anomaly 
is supported by three algorithms it is acceptable. Since each anomaly had to be detected 
by the three algorithms to be accepted, all algorithms contributed the same for the final 
results of the telephones approach. 
Results differing from the Cuscos project is something already expected since the 
Cuscos project was towards <user, telephone number> pairs and this project was towards 
the users and telephone numbers individually. Cuscos project detected about 1800 
anomalies and it covered about 58% of the list of confirmed anomalies. This project 
obtained 287 anomalies and it covered about 64% of the confirmed anomalies. It was 
possible to label each anomaly to a certain behavior, new anomalies were detected and 
the probability of false positives is much lower than in the previous work. This shows the 
objectives were achieved. 
For future work, it would be interesting to use time series to follow a user behavior 
[15]. Applying machine learning in time series could bring new relevant results. For 
example, the amount of times a user makes accesses could be normal compared with the 
number of days and amount of telephone numbers, but with time series, it would be 
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possible to detect if he had not ever made accesses and then, suddenly, made accesses 
fifteen days in a row. This example is not possible to detect with the actual methodology 
since, even though we have the number of distinct days, when a user accesses a telephone 
number in many different days we do not know if these days are close to each other or far 
apart. 
Another obvious future work will be to use DBSCAN for the telephone numbers 
approach. The algorithm had a great contribution for the users approach so in the future 
it would be worth to use it for better results. The affinity propagation, on the other hand, 
does not seem as helpful, so in this situation, the algorithm results do not compensate its 
complexity. 
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Appendix A 
To facilitate the visualization of the tables in appendix some abbreviations had to be 
used, Table 37 explains the meaning of each abbreviation. 
 
Table 37- Legend for abbreviations used 
Legend 
contamination Cont 
convergence Conv 
mindist MD 
minPontos MP 
NumberClusters NC 
NumberAnomalies NA 
SilhouetteScore SS 
VRC VRC 
PercentConfirmed PC 
RatioPercentAnomalies RPA 
Elliptic Envelope EE 
Isolation Forest IF 
Affinity Propagation AffProp 
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Appendix B –  Users approach: Score Tables 
for perspective Ratios 
 
Table 38- Score table for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 7 0,997574615 1281,68927 6,699029126 0,957004161 
0.005 32,6 0,988623399 252,2545191 25,24271845 0,775228008 
0.01 64,2 0,977934037 126,2927037 34,75728155 0,541365193 
0.05 323,5 0,894407194 25,45591003 55,04854369 0,170170826 
0.08 510,9 0,836592675 15,96084164 66,31067961 0,130381388 
0.1 653,4 0,790671737 12,00248914 65,33980583 0,100047826 
0.15 938 0,703370178 8,156368233 70,29126214 0,075469982 
0.2 1264,8 0,60555541 5,669708715 70,38834951 0,055743358 
0.25 1411,6 0,564734149 5,163502915 74,27184466 0,054369201 
0.3 1857,3 0,433729638 3,450894162 76,01941748 0,041160652 
0.35 2100,6 0,36314238 2,959352242 78,05825243 0,037598594 
0.4 2412,1 0,279728771 2,50182521 79,51456311 0,03418095 
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Table 39- Score table for K-means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 40- Score table for Elliptic Envelope 
 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 7 0,997593637 1300,074248 6,796116505 0,970873786 
0.005 30,8 0,989426631 267,7259665 21,3592233 0,695221778 
0.01 66 0,977873663 126,1001423 40,77669903 0,617828773 
0.05 320 0,897250104 25,82350509 58,25242718 0,182038835 
0.08 528 0,83258087 15,15753089 58,25242718 0,110326567 
0.1 660 0,792833292 11,96672822 62,13592233 0,094145337 
0.15 834 0,74072632 9,236224263 65,04854369 0,077995856 
0.2 1319 0,596911043 5,261211904 65,63106796 0,049758202 
0.25 1649 0,504745552 3,997661898 72,81553398 0,044157389 
0.3 1971,8 0,415310951 3,133966056 73,78640777 0,037432537 
0.35 2308 0,322944265 2,501142339 78,6407767 0,034073127 
0.4 2638 0,232623921 2,031091116 80,58252427 0,030546825 
 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 1 0,999741294 1401474 0,970873786 0,970873786 
3 2 0,998376826 8768785 1,941747573 0,970873786 
4 6 0,985976315 9166676 5,825242718 0,970873786 
5 29 0,968859585 11720905 28,15533981 0,970873786 
6 31 0,962453623 13733381 30,09708738 0,970873786 
7 30 0,959377864 15505791 29,12621359 0,970873786 
8 145 0,872299129 16662533 50,48543689 0,348175427 
9 140 0,866437913 18192786 48,54368932 0,346740638 
10 140 0,86656121 18156785 48,54368932 0,346740638 
11 177 0,844434846 18692557 49,51456311 0,279743294 
12 221 0,825941625 19532039 49,51456311 0,224047797 
15 175 0,488163751 24584792 57,2815534 0,327323162 
16 225 0,463755386 26883833 53,39805825 0,237324703 
18 265 0,504574157 30627562 60,19417476 0,227147829 
20 360 0,496647292 33127428 67,96116505 0,188781014 
25 284 0,409405165 40598867 66,01941748 0,232462738 
30 395 0,406316096 48333966 68,93203883 0,174511491 
35 426 0,433647078 52040299 71,84466019 0,168649437 
40 608 0,38153502 55559485 76,69902913 0,126149719 
45 589 0,389661748 57654817 77,66990291 0,131867407 
50 620 0,401519927 62326120 74,75728155 0,120576261 
60 881 0,385893245 70024084 76,69902913 0,087059057 
70 1118 0,345004674 76164258 78,6407767 0,070340587 
100 2009 0,370630262 93312387 81,55339806 0,040594026 
150 3174 0,373122315 1,19E+08 85,4368932 0,026917736 
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Table 41-Score Table for Affinity Propagation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the DBSCAN score table, since there are 725 combinations of parameters, only 
an excerpt with the relevant zone that has the best parameterization is shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conv NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
1 4984 6110 0,000843338 136,9274 89,32038835 0,014618721 
5 4977 6110 0,000620022 203,6966 89,32038835 0,014618721 
10 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
50 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
80 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
100 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
150 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
200 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
250 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
300 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
350 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
400 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
450 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
500 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
550 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
600 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
700 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
750 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
800 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
850 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
900 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
950 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
1000 6 29 0,967615559 11679513 28,15533981 0,970873786 
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Table 42- Score Table for DBSCAN 
MD MP NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
3 45 2 167 0,945615826 150,6231817 62,13592233 0,372071391 
3 50 2 170 0,944664115 49,73349892 62,13592233 0,365505425 
3 60 2 185 0,939951726 45,68667238 62,13592233 0,33586985 
3 70 2 189 0,938692345 44,71603417 62,13592233 0,328761494 
3 100 2 194 0,937109202 43,56493449 62,13592233 0,320288259 
3 40 2 160 0,947831964 52,85004159 61,16504854 0,382281553 
3 35 2 153 0,950029135 55,28344079 60,19417476 0,393425979 
3 15 2 129 0,957673043 65,53274808 59,22330097 0,459095356 
3 16 2 129 0,957673043 65,53274808 59,22330097 0,459095356 
3 18 2 133 0,956386169 63,57735932 59,22330097 0,445287977 
3 20 2 135 0,955747878 62,63359155 59,22330097 0,438691118 
3 25 2 145 0,952585355 58,29811923 59,22330097 0,408436558 
3 30 2 148 0,951626337 57,14134551 59,22330097 0,400157439 
3 5 5 104 0,820849141 25,35254035 58,25242718 0,560119492 
3 6 4 108 0,843479501 30,48199743 58,25242718 0,539374326 
3 7 3 108 0,86099733 43,04156996 58,25242718 0,539374326 
3 8 3 110 0,858277634 41,78007497 58,25242718 0,52956752 
3 9 3 114 0,858200903 40,19887792 58,25242718 0,510986203 
3 10 2 114 0,96248908 74,04898907 58,25242718 0,510986203 
3 11 2 114 0,96248908 74,04898907 58,25242718 0,510986203 
3 12 2 118 0,961203926 71,58301079 58,25242718 0,493664637 
3 1 64 100 0,788099662 6044603,383 54,36893204 0,54368932 
3 2 16 100 0,781916247 11,35322426 54,36893204 0,54368932 
3 3 9 100 0,783754195 16,60893615 54,36893204 0,54368932 
3 4 5 100 0,847052637 27,23485223 54,36893204 0,54368932 
3 150 2 0 0,927423429 37,47635622 0 0 
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Appendix C –  Users approach: Score Tables 
for perspective AccessDays 
Table 43-Score Table for Isolation Forest 
 Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 6,2 0,993426016 5627,006 8,333333333 1,353174603 
0.005 30,2 0,971874804 998,3187 13,75 0,45668052 
0.01 63,7 0,944305806 491,97 20,41666667 0,319598453 
0.05 325,1 0,788400191 136,5083 34,375 0,105626642 
0.08 523,6 0,719090453 112,7538 43,75 0,083409138 
0.1 657,7 0,676877727 102,7031 51,875 0,078869296 
0.15 986,8 0,582712874 79,95788 56,04166667 0,056785221 
0.2 1315,3 0,484376266 60,50006 67,08333333 0,051001524 
0.25 1642,8 0,45906079 66,21446 70,41666667 0,042857695 
0.3 1959,9 0,376070801 52,55676 72,70833333 0,03711409 
0.35 2296,3 0,291275261 41,10482 69,79166667 0,030396585 
0.4 2617,4 0,251877313 39,16419 77,91666667 0,029759021 
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Table 44- Score Table for K-means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 45- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 7 0,992900513 5194,038 8,333333333 1,19047619 
0.005 33 0,971967211 1072,295 16,66666667 0,505050505 
0.01 66 0,950783731 642,4933 25 0,378787879 
0.05 330 0,85641949 274,0775 45,83333333 0,138888889 
0.08 528 0,811600218 220,9407 58,33333333 0,110479798 
0.1 660 0,785756526 198,7682 62,5 0,09469697 
0.15 989 0,727626689 161,2772 70,83333333 0,071621166 
0.2 1319 0,668847838 134,4018 72,91666667 0,055281779 
0.25 1649 0,608097635 113,5769 75 0,04548211 
0.3 1978 0,547924893 97,05747 79,16666667 0,040023593 
0.35 2307,1 0,48744698 83,35425 85,41666667 0,037023392 
0.4 2638 0,423379529 71,51479 87,5 0,033169067 
 
 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 2 0,997612677 64204,72 4,166666667 2,083333333 
3 5 0,98694852 57734,98 8,333333333 1,666666667 
4 5 0,986772766 74774,03 8,333333333 1,666666667 
5 5 0,806309306 100235,2 8,333333333 1,666666667 
6 5 0,80688946 122253 8,333333333 1,666666667 
7 42 0,758349143 176422,9 18,75 0,446428571 
8 18 0,704820017 255773,9 12,5 0,694444444 
9 120 0,671093614 317392 27,08333333 0,225694444 
10 40 0,647522565 399519,6 18,75 0,46875 
11 146 0,6303512 456242,1 29,16666667 0,199771689 
12 313 0,599827345 501775,6 43,75 0,139776358 
15 314 0,564961006 636993,2 43,75 0,13933121 
16 266 0,574041501 717945,6 43,75 0,164473684 
18 347 0,540237979 836078,3 45,83333333 0,132084534 
20 347 0,525563179 902227 45,83333333 0,132084534 
25 589 0,514612647 1003416 60,41666667 0,102574986 
30 796 0,495507702 1121649 66,66666667 0,083752094 
35 1417 0,476575549 1187747 68,75 0,048517996 
40 1708 0,469245864 1243482 75 0,043911007 
45 1778 0,464780826 1273070 79,16666667 0,044525684 
50 2084 0,459832206 1314545 79,16666667 0,037987844 
60 2676 0,459759592 1382015 87,5 0,032698057 
70 2725 0,441861558 1446496 89,58333333 0,032874618 
100 3660 0,426372693 1643181 100 0,027322404 
150 4101 0,418900422 1867915 100 0,024384297 
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Table 46-Score Table for Affinity Propagation 
Conv NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
1 4163 5900 -2,4163E-05 0,433095949 100 0,016949153 
5 4138 5900 0,001876707 13,52655719 100 0,016949153 
10 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
50 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
80 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
100 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
150 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
200 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
250 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
300 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
350 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
400 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
450 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
500 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
550 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
600 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
700 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
750 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
800 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
850 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
900 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
950 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
1000 6 20 0,929654326 78660,00393 12,5 0,625 
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Table 47-Score Table for DBSCAN 
MD MP NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
1 1 22 23 0,795503135 20081,51 14,58333333 0,634057971 
1 2 3 23 0,897004352 809,2305 14,58333333 0,634057971 
1 3 3 23 0,897004352 809,2305 14,58333333 0,634057971 
1 4 2 24 0,978485171 1383,991 14,58333333 0,607638889 
1 5 2 25 0,977727461 1337,246 14,58333333 0,583333333 
1 6 2 25 0,977727461 1337,246 14,58333333 0,583333333 
1 7 3 38 0,859788022 654,0062 16,66666667 0,438596491 
1 8 3 38 0,859788022 654,0062 16,66666667 0,438596491 
1 9 3 38 0,858468246 633,2118 16,66666667 0,438596491 
1 10 3 38 0,859491512 612,999 16,66666667 0,438596491 
1 11 2 39 0,967707644 936,6201 16,66666667 0,427350427 
1 12 2 39 0,967707644 936,6201 16,66666667 0,427350427 
1 15 2 41 0,966367211 902,2831 16,66666667 0,406504065 
1 16 2 42 0,965697823 886,0818 18,75 0,446428571 
1 18 2 42 0,965697823 886,0818 18,75 0,446428571 
1 20 2 47 0,962314327 811,6377 18,75 0,39893617 
1 25 2 49 0,961029047 787,5716 18,75 0,382653061 
1 30 2 54 0,957891356 735,2164 18,75 0,347222222 
1 35 2 54 0,957891356 735,2164 13,125 0,243055556 
1 40 2 54 0,957891356 735,2164 18,75 0,347222222 
1 45 2 55 0,957270449 725,7435 18,75 0,340909091 
1 50 2 62 0,953023296 667,8822 22,91666667 0,369623656 
1 60 2 80 0,942879688 565,395 25 0,3125 
1 70 2 100 0,932768775 494,6059 25 0,25 
1 100 2 125 0,921369888 436,3876 27,08333333 0,216666667 
1 150 2 179 0,900412695 363,1143 39,58333333 0,22113594 
 
 
 
81 
 
Appendix D –  Users approach: Score Tables 
for perspective AccessTel 
Table 48-Score Table for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 6,9 0,991692339 4778,472 8,958333333 1,299603175 
0.005 32,4 0,968174301 1024,292 18,125 0,559100328 
0.01 63,7 0,943649013 590,2883 28,33333333 0,447311331 
0.05 327 0,824964929 242,5474 48,125 0,147096727 
0.08 525,3 0,770668001 202,4031 61,04166667 0,116214841 
0.1 657,3 0,733370445 179,4333 60,20833333 0,091592037 
0.15 979 0,692765793 174,4867 66,875 0,068295288 
0.2 1264,1 0,612040804 136,7357 68,33333333 0,05410751 
0.25 1627,6 0,5572962 122,5266 76,875 0,047218138 
0.3 1963,3 0,440916457 88,48226 79,58333333 0,040533374 
0.35 2208,2 0,414389964 83,84156 80,41666667 0,036425154 
0.4 2495,5 0,392192445 88,37041 83,33333333 0,03358674 
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Table 49- Score Table for K-means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 50- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 7 0,991707628 4841,907 10,41666667 1,488095238 
0.005 33 0,96759328 1017,79 25 0,757575758 
0.01 66 0,944581719 627,2996 35,41666667 0,536616162 
0.05 330 0,857128903 325,9364 54,16666667 0,164141414 
0.08 528 0,817411104 275,8846 62,5 0,118371212 
0.1 660 0,794660183 253,7028 66,66666667 0,101010101 
0.15 989 0,742560344 212,9662 68,75 0,069514661 
0.2 1318,5 0,684948576 179,2845 75 0,05688283 
0.25 1649 0,622642859 151,7892 81,25 0,049272286 
0.3 1978 0,55739309 129,3682 89,58333333 0,045289855 
0.35 2308 0,488572885 110,4037 91,66666667 0,039716927 
0.4 2638 0,416703254 94,23445 93,75 0,035538287 
 
 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 2 0,997213994 59019,11 4,166666667 2,083333333 
3 5 0,984124215 47546,51 8,333333333 1,666666667 
4 5 0,983944598 52269,62 8,333333333 1,666666667 
5 5 0,826275567 80032,34 8,333333333 1,666666667 
6 154 0,766460021 89194,62 20,83333333 0,135281385 
7 134 0,771308865 120506,2 16,66666667 0,124378109 
8 35 0,741628348 149773,2 14,58333333 0,416666667 
9 135 0,702864793 172311,7 16,66666667 0,12345679 
10 216 0,688182596 184493 20,83333333 0,096450617 
11 143 0,658028911 195618,3 18,75 0,131118881 
12 149 0,6572588 202812,1 20,83333333 0,139821029 
15 253 0,598702555 220334 39,58333333 0,156455863 
16 270 0,597389925 224408,1 39,58333333 0,146604938 
18 273 0,600187227 229199,1 45,83333333 0,167887668 
20 314 0,59624137 240137,1 43,75 0,13933121 
25 493 0,573435614 271738,3 45,83333333 0,092968222 
30 715 0,555569253 294382,7 64,58333333 0,09032634 
35 721 0,535623319 321452,2 66,66666667 0,09246417 
40 951 0,544852808 341884,5 68,75 0,072292324 
45 1048 0,51186691 353268,8 68,75 0,065601145 
50 981 0,500154889 365003,8 68,75 0,070081549 
60 1649 0,490566603 402931,9 72,91666667 0,044218718 
70 1733 0,485040775 427643,9 83,33333333 0,04808617 
100 2110 0,455433187 495015,8 81,25 0,038507109 
150 3028 0,442394536 607366,4 95,83333333 0,031649053 
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Table 51- Score Table for Affinity Propagation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conv NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
1 4265 6110 -5,76082E-05 0,446282077 100 0,016366612 
5 7 40 0,818317469 74933,92094 14,58333333 0,364583333 
10 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
50 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
80 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
100 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
150 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
200 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
250 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
300 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
350 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
400 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
450 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
500 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
550 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
600 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
700 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
750 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
800 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
850 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
900 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
950 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
1000 3123 5742 0,024153467 30,24007349 89,58333333 0,015601416 
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Table 52-Score Table for DBSCAN 
MD MP NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
1 1 47 73 0,658621172 6957,726 39,58333333 0,542237443 
1 2 12 73 0,656648318 92,00939 39,58333333 0,542237443 
1 3 7 73 0,658941057 139,7839 39,58333333 0,542237443 
1 4 3 78 0,659640945 337,6312 39,58333333 0,507478632 
1 5 4 89 0,648205148 212,1366 41,66666667 0,468164794 
1 6 3 93 0,653739088 293,9172 43,75 0,470430108 
1 7 3 94 0,637473928 280,336 43,75 0,465425532 
1 8 3 98 0,638295954 273,4176 43,75 0,446428571 
1 9 2 103 0,925217846 499,4031 43,75 0,424757282 
1 10 2 110 0,922210647 487,0109 43,75 0,397727273 
1 11 2 112 0,921312415 483,0045 43,75 0,390625 
1 12 2 113 0,920843057 480,6405 43,75 0,387168142 
1 15 3 146 0,805462477 234,2944 43,75 0,299657534 
1 16 3 152 0,800479024 229,4438 43,75 0,287828947 
1 18 2 158 0,905333965 430,9667 43,75 0,276898734 
1 20 2 169 0,902219576 423,442 43,75 0,25887574 
1 25 2 181 0,898225628 412,8265 43,75 0,241712707 
1 30 2 189 0,895946037 406,8691 43,75 0,231481481 
1 35 2 198 0,893181984 399,4597 45,625 0,230429293 
1 40 2 0 0,889882503 392,2773 0 0 
1 45 2 0 0,885264007 382,7018 0 0 
1 50 2 0 0,881111265 373,7791 0 0 
1 60 2 0 0,872301152 357,3791 0 0 
1 70 2 0 0,869778789 352,5585 0 0 
1 100 2 0 0,861573143 337,8646 0 0 
1 150 2 0 0,847999072 316,8198 0 0 
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Appendix E –  Users approach: Score Tables 
for perspective TelDays 
Table 53- Score Table for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 6,2 0,983106861 3961,906964 7,5 1,220238095 
0.005 30,5 0,93841581 1035,50056 13,95833333 0,459820944 
0.01 62,2 0,897887633 725,6472687 16,875 0,274152371 
0.05 326,1 0,724827482 409,4058815 36,66666667 0,112417836 
0.08 525,5 0,654312576 333,9051219 44,58333333 0,084851979 
0.1 656,8 0,622121508 315,0472103 48,33333333 0,07361132 
0.15 980,8 0,540577591 312,1055518 55 0,056065044 
0.2 1314,8 0,45896944 250,2433391 63,125 0,048012306 
0.25 1571,8 0,403808487 212,6125395 63,54166667 0,040025835 
0.3 1969 0,353976839 221,0274491 72,08333333 0,036604413 
0.35 2298,9 0,342776303 236,3386495 79,58333333 0,034619247 
0.4 2629,8 0,255551275 182,0835687 78,54166667 0,029866385 
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Table 54- Score Table for TelDays 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 55- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 7 0,982060942 3875,142365 8,333333333 1,19047619 
0.005 33 0,944815538 1472,270775 8,333333333 0,252525253 
0.01 66 0,91894271 1231,18083 8,333333333 0,126262626 
0.05 330 0,841836619 1031,431276 12,5 0,037878788 
0.08 528 0,809404537 948,9910139 14,58333333 0,027619949 
0.1 660 0,789664478 896,2193269 18,75 0,028409091 
0.15 989 0,738668445 766,5189696 37,5 0,037917088 
0.2 1319 0,683207856 653,9468502 54,16666667 0,041066464 
0.25 1649 0,628119533 564,2863165 62,5 0,037901759 
0.3 1978 0,570489667 487,8821081 77,08333333 0,03897034 
0.35 2308 0,51003453 421,4335907 81,25 0,03520364 
0.4 2638 0,450878221 366,2570969 85,41666667 0,032379328 
 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 2 0,993948744 31417,3 4,166666667 2,083333333 
3 2 0,807793261 37276,09 4,166666667 2,083333333 
4 159 0,72943149 38438,17 12,5 0,078616352 
5 159 0,729220393 42850,3 12,5 0,078616352 
6 52 0,687508357 53041,81 8,333333333 0,16025641 
7 125 0,671659377 66366,73 10,41666667 0,083333333 
8 236 0,656767919 81902,54 12,5 0,052966102 
9 136 0,642794409 95915,8 10,41666667 0,076593137 
10 202 0,633408491 111471,9 12,5 0,061881188 
11 174 0,608100333 129291 12,5 0,07183908 
12 255 0,597489375 145600,4 12,5 0,049019608 
15 539 0,566982288 172743 14,58333333 0,027056277 
16 522 0,54898123 180637,2 14,58333333 0,02793742 
18 505 0,522988729 186531,4 14,58333333 0,028877888 
20 670 0,530531369 194046,6 14,58333333 0,021766169 
25 981 0,511255655 210526,2 50 0,0509684 
30 1003 0,508574435 223091,5 50 0,049850449 
35 1277 0,496810795 230879,2 52,08333333 0,040785696 
40 1576 0,486589444 238223,4 58,33333333 0,037013536 
45 1662 0,461241535 237657,5 62,5 0,037605295 
50 1995 0,468421472 243559,6 68,75 0,034461153 
60 2236 0,460150926 247584,9 72,91666667 0,032610316 
70 2641 0,470250297 254568,3 77,08333333 0,029187177 
100 3132 0,44486671 278845,3 93,75 0,02993295 
150 3770 0,421792421 304670,6 95,83333333 0,025419982 
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Table 56- Score Table for Affinity Propagation 
Conv NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
1 3356 5830 0,000869323 25,15233809 97,91666667 0,016795312 
5 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
10 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
50 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
80 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
100 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
150 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
200 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
250 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
300 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
350 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
400 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
450 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
500 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
550 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
600 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
700 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
750 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
800 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
850 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
900 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
950 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
1000 3267 5830 0,004691219 26,45787772 97,91666667 0,016795312 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Table 57- Score Table for DBSCAN 
MD MP NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.5 1 21 43 0,330916699 2938,071174 10,41666667 0,242248062 
0.5 2 7 43 0,754241051 333,4875929 10,41666667 0,242248062 
0.5 3 3 43 0,85574937 825,3281688 10,41666667 0,242248062 
0.5 4 3 43 0,85574937 825,3281688 10,41666667 0,242248062 
0.5 5 3 45 0,854282384 760,8195061 10,41666667 0,231481481 
0.5 6 3 45 0,854282384 760,8195061 10,41666667 0,231481481 
0.5 7 4 46 0,855569245 429,376321 12,5 0,27173913 
0.5 8 2 47 0,92880472 1194,049892 12,5 0,265957447 
0.5 9 3 53 0,826802331 614,2336281 12,5 0,235849057 
0.5 10 2 56 0,922357039 1169,440454 12,5 0,223214286 
0.5 11 2 57 0,921673106 1166,82318 12,5 0,219298246 
0.5 12 2 57 0,921673106 1166,82318 12,5 0,219298246 
0.5 15 2 63 0,916842129 1130,719541 12,5 0,198412698 
0.5 16 2 65 0,914702986 1101,746763 14,58333333 0,224358974 
0.5 18 2 67 0,912387435 1068,48192 16,66666667 0,248756219 
0.5 20 2 83 0,90236756 1036,731677 16,66666667 0,200803213 
0.5 25 2 106 0,887319999 959,2677544 20,83333333 0,196540881 
0.5 30 2 153 0,872307978 989,5421694 20,83333333 0,136165577 
0.5 35 2 164 0,864600461 933,8374523 27,08333333 0,165142276 
0.5 40 2 183 0,857692915 922,0121242 27,08333333 0,147996357 
0.5 45 2 194 0,854134142 918,3228998 29,16666667 0,150343643 
0.5 50 2 0 0,849677015 936,4150695 0 0 
0.5 60 2 0 0,838561061 947,9047479 0 0 
0.5 70 2 0 0,832938345 945,2039124 0 0 
0.5 100 2 0 0,822067732 936,1542527 0 0 
0.5 1 21 43 0,330916699 2938,071174 10,41666667 0,242248062 
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Appendix F –  Users approach: Score Tables 
for perspective All 
Table 58- Score Table for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 6,8 0,992772836 1136,904 9,375 1,374007937 
0.005 32,6 0,987344693 231,5424 18,75 0,575284091 
0.01 64,7 0,898036097 85,13888 19,79167 0,305668481 
0.05 325,9 0,884184891 24,25781 46,45833 0,142920357 
0.08 520 0,818980396 15,08234 54,375 0,104725424 
0.1 655 0,772548877 11,21517 48,125 0,073463543 
0.15 971,3 0,583921115 6,613347 52,5 0,054068923 
0.2 1303,1 0,575145139 5,18344 66,66667 0,051160628 
0.25 1626,8 0,478573633 3,99977 69,16667 0,04255675 
0.3 1948,6 0,393791695 3,157682 72,70833 0,037314323 
0.35 2295 0,299124888 2,501258 77,5 0,033767959 
0.4 2597,3 0,210925139 2,041027 79,58333 0,030586449 
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Table 59- Score Table for K-means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 60- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 7 0,982060942 3875,142365 8,333333333 1,19047619 
0.005 33 0,944815538 1472,270775 8,333333333 0,252525253 
0.01 66 0,91894271 1231,18083 8,333333333 0,126262626 
0.05 330 0,841836619 1031,431276 12,5 0,037878788 
0.08 528 0,809404537 948,9910139 14,58333333 0,027619949 
0.1 660 0,789664478 896,2193269 18,75 0,028409091 
0.15 989 0,738668445 766,5189696 37,5 0,037917088 
0.2 1319 0,683207856 653,9468502 54,16666667 0,041066464 
0.25 1649 0,628119533 564,2863165 62,5 0,037901759 
0.3 1978 0,570489667 487,8821081 77,08333333 0,03897034 
0.35 2308 0,51003453 421,4335907 81,25 0,03520364 
0.4 2638 0,450878221 366,2570969 85,41666667 0,032379328 
 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 2 0,993948744 31417,3 0,055555556 2,083333333 
3 2 0,807793261 37276,09 0,055555556 2,083333333 
4 159 0,72943149 38438,17 5,888888889 0,078616352 
5 159 0,729220393 42850,3 5,888888889 0,078616352 
6 52 0,687508357 53041,81 1,722222222 0,16025641 
7 125 0,671659377 66366,73 4,611111111 0,083333333 
8 236 0,656767919 81902,54 9,222222222 0,052966102 
9 136 0,642794409 95915,8 5,055555556 0,076593137 
10 202 0,633408491 111471,9 7,777777778 0,061881188 
11 174 0,608100333 129291 6,555555556 0,07183908 
12 255 0,597489375 145600,4 10,05555556 0,049019608 
15 539 0,566982288 172743 20 0,027056277 
16 522 0,54898123 180637,2 19,27777778 0,02793742 
18 505 0,522988729 186531,4 18,83333333 0,028877888 
20 670 0,530531369 194046,6 21,88888889 0,021766169 
25 981 0,511255655 210526,2 33,55555556 0,0509684 
30 1003 0,508574435 223091,5 33,72222222 0,049850449 
35 1277 0,496810795 230879,2 42,44444444 0,040785696 
40 1576 0,486589444 238223,4 50,72222222 0,037013536 
45 1662 0,461241535 237657,5 52,72222222 0,037605295 
50 1995 0,468421472 243559,6 61,83333333 0,034461153 
60 2236 0,460150926 247584,9 67,11111111 0,032610316 
70 2641 0,470250297 254568,3 74,61111111 0,029187177 
100 3132 0,44486671 278845,3 83 0,02993295 
150 3770 0,421792421 304670,6 92,22222222 0,025419982 
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Table 61- Score Table for Affinity Propagation 
Conv NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
1 5159 6110 0,00065 84,63491 100 0,016366612 
5 8 16 0,957964 6583795 18,75 1,171875 
10 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
50 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
80 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
100 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
150 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
200 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
250 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
300 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
350 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
400 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
450 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
500 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
550 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
600 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
700 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
750 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
800 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
850 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
900 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
950 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
1000 9 32 0,94048 8489630 33,33333333 1,041666667 
 
 
For the DBSCAN score table, since there are 725 combinations of parameters, only 
an excerpt with the relevant zone that has the best parameterization is shown. 
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 Table 62- Score Table for DBSCAN 
 
 
MD MP NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
3 1 87 119 0,636188571 2049030,58 41,66666667 0,350140056 
3 2 17 119 0,627834173 73,48719155 41,66666667 0,350140056 
3 3 10 119 0,644993668 109,3776573 41,66666667 0,350140056 
3 4 4 120 0,783224416 264,408829 41,66666667 0,347222222 
3 5 3 120 0,798750397 383,0384558 41,66666667 0,347222222 
3 6 3 123 0,79884861 372,9795299 41,66666667 0,338753388 
3 7 3 127 0,798551558 360,1155519 41,66666667 0,32808399 
3 10 2 149 0,947997701 565,3297296 45,83333333 0,307606264 
3 8 3 136 0,794100891 331,4099235 41,66666667 0,306372549 
3 9 3 144 0,79363273 311,732838 43,75 0,303819444 
3 11 2 151 0,947328901 557,707419 45,83333333 0,303532009 
3 15 2 167 0,941927996 504,579847 50 0,299401198 
3 16 2 168 0,941591518 501,6931238 50 0,297619048 
3 12 2 155 0,945982561 543,3783745 45,83333333 0,295698925 
3 18 2 173 0,939898763 487,3769035 50 0,289017341 
3 20 2 174 0,939559357 484,6017346 50 0,287356322 
3 25 2 185 0,935910305 455,8260253 50 0,27027027 
3 30 2 196 0,932278688 429,7724019 50 0,255102041 
3 35 2 0 0,930271875 417,1190039 0 0 
3 40 2 0 0,925025775 386,3231089 0 0 
3 45 2 0 0,923708824 379,2960715 0 0 
3 50 2 0 0,921054912 366,1260229 0 0 
3 60 2 0 0,914866467 337,6946247 0 0 
3 70 2 0 0,910982731 321,8074527 0 0 
3 100 2 0 0,900755892 285,7958985 0 0 
3 150 2 0 0,883986353 240,6963985 0 0 
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Appendix G – Telephones approach: Score 
Tables for perspective Ratios 
Table 63- Table Score for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 306,9 0,171935839 2348,671116 14,75728155 0,048731332 
0.005 1222,3 0,651724741 1092,260817 31,55339806 0,026011128 
0.01 1821,4 0,816497297 570,6009541 38,44660194 0,021144508 
0.05 3181,2 0,540378954 187,1033077 43,49514563 0,013675396 
0.08 3427,2 0,67721979 114,4898091 44,95145631 0,013140453 
0.1 3633,9 0,435544668 80,62809802 45,4368932 0,012517595 
0.15 3847,2 0,674710427 66,74886705 46,11650485 0,012001966 
0.2 3999,1 0,520744918 47,02463664 46,01941748 0,011513405 
0.25 4150,9 0,39797568 31,33238595 46,40776699 0,011182864 
0.3 4205,8 0,406533014 32,24236694 46,40776699 0,011039528 
0.35 4253,4 0,27513385 21,76541435 46,11650485 0,010851538 
0.4 4338,2 0,211691851 17,19424783 46,60194175 0,010745463 
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Table 64-Score Table for K-means (silhouette score and VRC did not run 10 times when number of clusters 
was 2 and 3 because of situation explained before in which no anomalies were detected) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 65- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 90,2 0,998281553 1164,611 1,941747573 0,021527556 
0.005 948,4 0,992474683 247,3747 32,7184466 0,034450151 
0.01 1505,1 0,982189095 123,037 32,23300971 0,021216849 
0.05 2857,2 0,901118726 23,60634 42,13592233 0,014974046 
0.08 3314,1 0,842648539 14,28698 44,75728155 0,013602172 
0.1 3415,9 0,799920622 11,17994 44,95145631 0,013183969 
0.15 3705,5 0,703486843 7,038815 45,24271845 0,012234868 
0.2 3992,5 0,597156296 4,968469 45,33980583 0,011364306 
0.25 4080,4 0,503037641 3,726357 46,31067961 0,011356227 
0.3 4222,1 0,404150379 2,898192 46,21359223 0,010950499 
0.35 4326,8 0,30235826 2,306707 46,60194175 0,010771964 
0.4 4376,3 0,204260416 1,863042 46,60194175 0,010649119 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 24 0,79765457 333378,3165 5,825242718 0,242718 
3 24 0,78263856 583343,3668 5,825242718 0,242718 
4 35 0,77293866 743378,3664 9,708737864 0,277393 
5 89 0,767774269 782883,2955 17,47572816 0,196356 
6 2278 0,670359216 880930,8775 42,7184466 0,018753 
7 1009 0,658473098 881317,4806 32,03883495 0,031753 
8 1514 0,63280485 905657,7671 35,9223301 0,023727 
9 1153 0,657879099 943762,3047 33,98058252 0,029471 
10 2038 0,638400287 971398,6044 38,83495146 0,019055 
11 2563 0,635205549 1036998,488 42,7184466 0,016667 
12 2563 0,646015056 1082380,927 42,7184466 0,016667 
15 1539 0,658761099 1111047,604 37,86407767 0,024603 
16 3061 0,673498355 1146796,909 43,68932039 0,014273 
18 2881 0,717004858 1144504,089 42,7184466 0,014828 
20 2820 0,717833219 1252095,828 41,74757282 0,014804 
25 3054 0,71761229 1305109,827 44,66019417 0,014624 
30 3115 0,731033874 1389557,704 43,68932039 0,014025 
35 3365 0,743036388 1460112,484 43,68932039 0,012983 
40 3457 0,783247432 1497044,126 46,60194175 0,01348 
45 3545 0,792909381 1560882,705 46,60194175 0,013146 
50 3645 0,78871582 1597395,484 46,60194175 0,012785 
60 3593 0,817526317 1719676,075 46,60194175 0,01297 
70 3991 0,842264347 1837152,854 46,60194175 0,011677 
100 4208 0,877031506 2198242,083 46,60194175 0,011075 
150 4210 0,903878319 2759702,478 46,60194175 0,011069 
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Appendix H – Telephones approach: Score 
Tables for perspective AccessDay 
Table 66- Score Table for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 382,9 0,974007065 129964,3959 27,37864078 0,07152534 
0.005 1391,4 0,925816948 67779,39795 38,54368932 0,027708635 
0.01 1972 0,908313973 60990,69953 41,65048544 0,021124813 
0.05 3268,1 0,794822138 49434,77816 45,4368932 0,013908923 
0.08 3544,3 0,749920511 43876,2308 45,63106796 0,012885999 
0.1 3705,1 0,743406426 48582,56263 45,63106796 0,012316542 
0.15 3919,9 0,668359873 39832,20399 45,82524272 0,011692101 
0.2 4051,7 0,64148847 37830,79926 46,31067961 0,011432891 
0.25 4190 0,578137599 32328,61816 46,60194175 0,011123798 
0.3 4262,5 0,535800947 29734,95193 46,40776699 0,010887975 
0.35 4316,6 0,549836062 31254,22088 46,60194175 0,010802306 
0.4 4294,5 0,530245605 31799,86729 46,50485437 0,010838393 
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Table 67- Score Table for K-means 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 19 0,953455 3249780,703 3,883495146 0,204394481 
3 42 0,953455 3249780,703 9,708737864 0,231160425 
4 41 0,830364 814462,1937 9,708737864 0,236798484 
5 102 0,812718 888271,9039 20,38834951 0,19988578 
6 1180 0,748804 914833,1644 38,83495146 0,032910976 
7 2248 0,693341 950012,1624 43,68932039 0,019434751 
8 1901 0,724413 1004193,928 41,74757282 0,021960848 
9 1094 0,645468 1033347,074 35,9223301 0,032835768 
10 1118 0,659611 1100836,701 35,9223301 0,032130886 
11 2248 0,627769 1127465,483 43,68932039 0,019434751 
12 2430 0,625421 1145162,405 44,66019417 0,018378681 
15 2567 0,65986 1203241,313 44,66019417 0,017397816 
16 2705 0,659895 1225607,888 44,66019417 0,016510238 
18 2753 0,66214 1245353,991 44,66019417 0,016222373 
20 2904 0,664072 1266244,524 44,66019417 0,015378855 
25 3251 0,74185 1343596,35 45,63106796 0,01403601 
30 3403 0,792088 1383665,632 45,63106796 0,013409071 
35 3423 0,759988 1451855,564 45,63106796 0,013330724 
40 3447 0,757151 1488842,243 45,63106796 0,013237908 
45 3872 0,765899 1548110,735 45,63106796 0,011784883 
50 3946 0,829275 1651400,367 45,63106796 0,011563879 
60 3983 0,854064 1747289,157 46,60194175 0,011700211 
70 3968 0,882333 1892622,399 45,63106796 0,011499765 
100 4121 0,925871 2353280,056 46,60194175 0,011308406 
150 4121 0,953064 3249780,703 46,60194175 0,011308406 
 
Table 68- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 393 0,984766205 150055,1 26,21359223 0,066701253 
0.005 1292 0,939723048 87399,55 36,89320388 0,028555111 
0.01 1840 0,920718689 76727,68 42,7184466 0,023216547 
0.05 3000 0,828047311 63000,92 44,66019417 0,014886731 
0.08 3408 0,783137563 57470,86 45,63106796 0,013389398 
0.1 3557 0,762775301 54654,06 45,63106796 0,012828526 
0.15 3978 0,661279444 42795,78 46,60194175 0,011714917 
0.2 3978 0,663374746 42795,78 46,60194175 0,011714917 
0.25 3978 0,661904005 42795,78 46,60194175 0,011714917 
0.3 4167 0,588154277 35760,52 46,60194175 0,011183571 
0.35 4167 0,58459395 35760,52 46,60194175 0,011183571 
0.4 4368 0,473502289 27504,87 46,60194175 0,010668943 
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Appendix I – Telephones approach: Score 
Tables for perspective AccessActor 
Table 69-Score Table for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 419,1 0,971850433 108986,7 22,52427184 0,053947878 
0.005 1349,6 0,919510273 66504,18 36,40776699 0,026980878 
0.01 1912,8 0,895412815 61824,65 40,19417476 0,021012993 
0.05 3247,4 0,791445043 53773,06 44,5631068 0,013726401 
0.08 3503 0,76039211 51064,26 44,75728155 0,01279779 
0.1 3666 0,724654559 44947,45 45,24271845 0,012348379 
0.15 3903,9 0,648292314 39213,11 46,01941748 0,011788686 
0.2 4039 0,644585403 42670,47 46,40776699 0,011492038 
0.25 4165,5 0,58752025 36366,83 46,60194175 0,011190698 
0.3 4219,6 0,551515881 32656,16 46,40776699 0,010999022 
0.35 4229,8 0,542012133 31055,69 46,50485437 0,011022783 
0.4 4364,2 0,482290305 29507,84 46,60194175 0,010678553 
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Table 70- Score Table for K-means (silhouette score and VRC did not run 10 times when number of clusters 
was 2, 3 and 4 because of situation explained before in which no anomalies were detected) 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 20 0,88837312 4834895 3,883495146 0,194174757 
3 43 0,88837312 4834895 10,67961165 0,248363062 
4 37 0,817990307 843361,1 8,737864078 0,236158489 
5 92 0,792522931 905121,3 18,44660194 0,200506543 
6 1797 0,704611898 939778,2 41,74757282 0,023231816 
7 1668 0,719899235 984970,3 40,77669903 0,024446462 
8 2429 0,680913349 1034358 43,68932039 0,017986546 
9 2626 0,676539321 1069796 44,66019417 0,017006928 
10 1221 0,634492661 1142791 35,9223301 0,029420418 
11 2283 0,625206474 1191351 43,68932039 0,019136803 
12 2556 0,62370157 1201208 44,66019417 0,017472689 
15 2820 0,663363478 1298887 44,66019417 0,015836948 
16 2950 0,661507103 1333213 44,66019417 0,015139049 
18 3235 0,653892251 1399407 44,66019417 0,013805315 
20 2794 0,668738163 1452325 43,68932039 0,015636836 
25 3125 0,74045084 1565766 44,66019417 0,014291262 
30 3305 0,676621629 1687810 44,66019417 0,013512918 
35 3422 0,809207192 1788727 44,66019417 0,013050904 
40 3640 0,827832936 1954768 44,66019417 0,012269284 
45 4014 0,822653367 2067536 46,60194175 0,011609851 
50 3926 0,82274727 2291244 45,63106796 0,011622789 
60 3891 0,867372918 2607552 45,63106796 0,011727337 
70 3998 0,89943198 2925980 46,60194175 0,011656314 
100 4136 0,935985149 3890233 46,60194175 0,011267394 
150 4136 0,965996698 5370329 46,60194175 0,011267394 
 
Table 71- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 393 0,972628693 138042,5 26,21359223 0,066701253 
0.005 1292 0,939104495 83176,97 36,89320388 0,028555111 
0.01 1920 0,897016138 73832,57 43,68932039 0,022754854 
0.05 3000 0,824320927 64562,49 44,66019417 0,014886731 
0.08 3408 0,776474738 59691,27 45,63106796 0,013389398 
0.1 3557 0,755852689 57135,9 45,63106796 0,012828526 
0.15 3827 0,696821197 50328,69 45,63106796 0,011923456 
0.2 3978 0,655305112 45471,45 46,60194175 0,011714917 
0.25 3978 0,653833928 45471,45 46,60194175 0,011714917 
0.3 4368 0,479966418 29667,47 46,60194175 0,010668943 
0.35 4368 0,467223567 29667,47 46,60194175 0,010668943 
0.4 4565 0,206821277 15992,77 46,60194175 0,010208531 
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Appendix J – Telephones approach: Score 
Tables for perspective DayActors 
Table 72- Score Table for Isolation Forest 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 410,6 0,952388729 150550,5 23,00970874 0,056474654 
0.005 1375,1 0,924727799 144991,7 38,6407767 0,028104363 
0.01 2002 0,887600907 147291,9 42,81553398 0,021388695 
0.05 3440,1 0,781906197 160482,3 44,66019417 0,012987376 
0.08 3662 0,754215232 152829,9 44,85436893 0,0122607 
0.1 3788,3 0,742304051 164235 45,04854369 0,011896104 
0.15 4051,7 0,71690537 185668,9 45,63106796 0,011262635 
0.2 4034,3 0,717565998 181188,3 45,63106796 0,01131186 
0.25 4060 0,723785465 191597,4 45,63106796 0,011239179 
0.3 4233,6 0,756306302 220191,8 46,31067961 0,010944028 
0.35 4274,9 0,765072971 222433,2 46,50485437 0,010883156 
0.4 4208,8 0,754398467 216106,9 46,21359223 0,010986193 
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Table 73- Score Table for K-means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 74- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 377 0,965494318 206151 29,12621359 0,077257861 
0.005 1374 0,921328611 168774,6 38,83495146 0,028264157 
0.01 1997 0,895610877 193192,7 42,7184466 0,02139131 
0.05 3595 0,792218129 231958,8 44,66019417 0,012422863 
0.08 3595 0,795296048 231958,8 44,66019417 0,012422863 
0.1 3773 0,811020224 295654,5 44,66019417 0,011836786 
0.15 4308 0,770700546 232446,6 46,60194175 0,010817535 
0.2 4308 0,775881803 232446,6 46,60194175 0,010817535 
0.25 4308 0,774006982 232446,6 46,60194175 0,010817535 
0.3 4816 0,774006982 232446,6 46,60194175 0,009676483 
0.35 4816 0,774006982 232446,6 46,60194175 0,009676483 
0.4 4816 0,774006982 232446,6 46,60194175 0,009676483 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 92 0,973737938 5077840 18,44660194 0,200506543 
3 86 0,973737938 5077840 15,53398058 0,180627681 
4 2761 0,841791995 623819,5 44,66019417 0,016175369 
5 2761 0,843503852 649257 44,66019417 0,016175369 
6 1358 0,859290731 694051 37,86407767 0,027882237 
7 1530 0,849215218 720063,8 37,86407767 0,024747763 
8 2079 0,851311786 755032,9 38,83495146 0,01867963 
9 2350 0,913258896 758433 41,74757282 0,017764925 
10 2350 0,90402468 800855 41,74757282 0,017764925 
11 2803 0,917998719 839179,5 44,66019417 0,015932998 
12 2761 0,904925963 877787,1 44,66019417 0,016175369 
15 3248 0,929261829 959429,6 44,66019417 0,01375006 
16 3303 0,932171093 993478 44,66019417 0,0135211 
18 3605 0,957272261 1071916 44,66019417 0,012388403 
20 3649 0,958509068 1105498 44,66019417 0,012239023 
25 3718 0,968310247 1316004 44,66019417 0,012011887 
30 3734 0,978623159 1454256 44,66019417 0,011960416 
35 3734 0,982701296 1554090 44,66019417 0,011960416 
40 3734 0,986764549 1738819 44,66019417 0,011960416 
45 3734 0,986679964 1923231 44,66019417 0,011960416 
50 3734 0,987761128 2036439 44,66019417 0,011960416 
60 3734 0,991954961 2357282 44,66019417 0,011960416 
70 3734 0,994775153 2631242 44,66019417 0,011960416 
100 3734 0,995257359 3543302 44,66019417 0,011960416 
150 3734 0,996740164 5616217 44,66019417 0,011960416 
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Appendix K – Telephones approach: Score 
Tables for perspective All 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 390,5 0,954169618 74249,03 21,84466019 0,056452221 
0.005 1327,2 0,86501779 40257,77 36,40776699 0,027408996 
0.01 1924,3 0,840375255 37503,13 40,97087379 0,021301815 
0.05 3271,9 0,723115038 36305,46 44,95145631 0,013744416 
0.08 3540,9 0,683553387 37937,42 44,95145631 0,012699879 
0.1 3687,8 0,640015049 35891,98 45,24271845 0,012270525 
0.15 3951,1 0,579175353 32611,41 45,63106796 0,011550796 
0.2 4053,5 0,543577091 32668,29 46,31067961 0,011430915 
0.25 4180 0,507257573 31540,77 46,50485437 0,011126436 
0.3 4236,2 0,483635516 32211,74 46,60194175 0,01100158 
0.35 4295,7 0,435778041 27437,46 46,11650485 0,010739432 
0.4 4374,5 0,42611963 30578,33 46,60194175 0,010653384 
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Table 75- Score Table for K-means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 76- Score Table for Elliptic Envelope 
Cont NA SS VRC PC RPA 
0.001 362,5 0,966012418 109221,6 26,40776699 0,073477073 
0.005 1288,4 0,8863761 56827,68 38,25242718 0,029696132 
0.01 1781,2 0,869294158 50315,34 40,19417476 0,022625519 
0.05 2964,1 0,771615802 52174,36 44,75728155 0,015137053 
0.08 3408,2 0,710476609 48559,94 45,72815534 0,013451196 
0.1 3540,1 0,689417313 50649,91 45,72815534 0,012951669 
0.15 3816,1 0,633562946 46612,84 46,11650485 0,012109166 
0.2 3795,9 0,610002504 47698,55 46,60194175 0,012294396 
0.25 4190,7 0,480640498 36621,36 46,60194175 0,011134957 
0.3 4073,6 0,544124324 40964,43 46,60194175 0,011452898 
0.35 4231,2 0,448316576 33323,45 46,60194175 0,011032122 
0.4 4238,9 0,459124718 34484,65 46,60194175 0,011014477 
 
NC NA SS VRC PC RPA 
2 26 0,882772553 575198,2 5,825242718 0,224047797 
3 49 0,882772553 575198,2 10,67961165 0,217951258 
4 46 0,838557805 528851,4 10,67961165 0,232165471 
5 98 0,796891793 514085 19,41747573 0,198137507 
6 94 0,789260494 478763,3 19,41747573 0,206568891 
7 98 0,659619604 456383,8 19,41747573 0,198137507 
8 1639 0,639835086 472299 37,86407767 0,023101939 
9 2294 0,58400587 464968,4 41,74757282 0,018198593 
10 2091 0,589436037 473718,6 39,80582524 0,019036741 
11 2724 0,585836586 469443,2 44,66019417 0,016395079 
12 2698 0,585787766 483545,7 44,66019417 0,016553074 
15 2702 0,568579573 484065,6 42,7184466 0,015809936 
16 1692 0,571792271 484446,3 40,77669903 0,024099704 
18 2751 0,61531729 503318,4 44,66019417 0,016234167 
20 2365 0,647511499 504153 43,68932039 0,018473286 
25 3285 0,696979842 522830,7 45,63106796 0,013890736 
30 3155 0,706069286 542403,7 44,66019417 0,014155371 
35 3290 0,711818375 526648,3 44,66019417 0,013574527 
40 3350 0,746568274 538825,8 44,66019417 0,013331401 
45 3633 0,749701065 538091,1 44,66019417 0,012292924 
50 3389 0,771126768 530916,9 45,63106796 0,013464464 
60 3942 0,788824185 550539,8 46,60194175 0,011821903 
70 3868 0,804079522 554833,3 46,60194175 0,012048072 
100 4206 0,832533783 588059,3 46,60194175 0,011079872 
150 4307 0,870929224 635481,6 46,60194175 0,010820047 
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Appendix L – Final Results 
The two following tables show the final results and the algorithms responsible for 
the detection of each anomaly. 
 
Table 77- Table with final Results 
Id 
Anomaly_Type Detected_by_Algorithms 
1093 type1; All 
1215 type10;  type1; All 
1855 type10;  type1; All 
188612 type10;  type4; All 
18905 type6;  type5; All 
20137 type3;  type2; All 
2133 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
22506 type10;  type1; All 
2328 type10;  type1; All 
23308 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
23496 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
25401 type10;  type1; All 
2697 type10;  type1; All 
2852 type10;  type1; All 
2876 type10;  type1; All 
291554 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
311082 type2; All 
31754 type10;  type1; All 
318909 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
320532 type10;  type1; All 
32076 type10;  type1; All 
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32135 type10;  type1; All 
321994 type10;  type1; All 
32203 type10;  type1; All 
32485 type10;  type1; All 
32614 type1; All 
328563 type10;  type1; All 
329234 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
336232 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
35839 type10;  type1; All 
37234 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
38253 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
40499 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
41257 type10;  type1; All 
41272 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
41522 type10;  type1; All 
41762 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
4182 type10;  type1; All 
4298 type10;  type1; All 
43509 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43522 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43532 type10;  type1; All 
43534 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43553 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43564 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43565 type10;  type1; All 
43566 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43571 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43843 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
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4428 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
45751 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
49936 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
50064 type10;  type1; All 
50455 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
53239 type10;  type1; All 
5334 type10;  type1; All 
5884 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
57 type9; All 
58 type9;  type8; All 
59 type9;  type8; All 
60 type9;  type8; All 
2936 type1; All 
3018 type2; All 
32323 type10;  type1; All 
336499 type10;  type4; All 
36205 type10;  type1; All 
50396 type1; 
Affinity Propagation;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   
DBSCAN; 
53293 type1; All 
53320 type1; All 
23303 type2; All 
19531 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
23467 type1; All 
2930 type1; All 
31850 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
32194 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
46268 type10;  type1; All 
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5366 type10;  type1; All 
7657 type10;  type1; All 
2191 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
23203 type10;  type1; All 
23513 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
2589 type1; All 
2990 type1; All 
31792 type1; 
Affinity Propagation; Isolation Forest; Elliptic Envelope; 
DBSCAN; 
32291 type1; All 
3293 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
341877 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
46680 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
7552 type10;  type1; All 
7561 type10;  type1; All 
227543 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
291549 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
328790 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
35778 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
108559 type1; All 
23297 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23307 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23348 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
23358 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23380 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
23443 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
23454 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23460 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
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23477 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23481 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23523 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23553 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
23559 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
2706 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
289171 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
3027 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
318526 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
321881 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
3236 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
329232 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
3300 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
37480 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
40077 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
40548 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
40570 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
40735 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
41012 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
41703 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
4228 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
4329 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
4452 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
4464 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
45178 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
45410 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
45663 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
45668 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
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45710 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
46362 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
46541 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
49838 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
49859 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
50051 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
50060 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
53128 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
5390 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
6485 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
7473 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
7575 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
329235 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
41592 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
4324 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
4618 type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
23558 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
330543 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
353430 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
41798 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
46669 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   DBSCAN; 
5885 type10;  type1; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
1238 type4; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
2960 type3;  type2; All 
4234 type2; All 
48357 type3;  type2; All 
544 type3;  type2; All 
1998 type4; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
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43923 type6;  type5; All 
53083 type2; All 
542574 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
162 type5; All 
163 type4; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
164 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
165 type7;  type6; All 
166 type4; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
19271 type3;  type2; All 
31772 type3;  type2; All 
31949 type6; All 
320967 type2; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
32109 type6; All 
36096 type3;  type2; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
39855 type2; All 
39956 type6;  type5; All 
46276 type3;  type2; All 
52904 type2; Affinity Propagation;   Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
177 type5; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
111841 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
28529 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
31660 type9; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
31790 type9; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
31882 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
31890 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
31967 type9; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
32020 type9; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
32041 type9;  type7; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
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32083 type9; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
32340 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
32356 type9; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
32425 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
32538 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
343908 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
431726 type9; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
43897 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
46184 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
547814 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
552568 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
552575 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
199 type5; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
200 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
201 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
202 type5; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
203 type6;  type5; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
204 type6;  type5; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
205 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
206 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
207 type6; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
208 type5; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
209 type9; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
210 type6;  type5; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
211 type9; Kmeans;   Isolation Forest;   DBSCAN; 
212 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
19318 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
316726 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
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31969 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
32506 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
46988 type9;  type8; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
892 
Does not belong 
to any type. Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   DBSCAN; 
44764 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
2828 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
2474 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
4218 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
24651 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
53187 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
32763 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
53366 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
49841 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
22747 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
31887 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
49895 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
7525 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
49937 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
32188 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
289166 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
18598 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
2484 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
18766 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
44479 type6;  type5; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
2538 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
46492 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
42178 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
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28393 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
49832 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
3376 
Does not belong 
to any type. Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
2914 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
4215 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
7434 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
46675 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
345745 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
49767 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
23329 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
53364 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
23177 type3;  type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
33715 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
2688 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
32233 type3;  type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
324239 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
33496 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
311174 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
46943 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
47415 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
289169 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
18796 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
45431 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
4214 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
887 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
31823 
Does not belong 
to any type. Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
28997 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
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44999 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
39892 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
289156 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
47243 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
38258 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
32667 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
28679 type5; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
487 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
98982 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
7598 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
1599 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
42137 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
7676 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
4221 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
32156 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
7381 type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
1241 type3;  type2; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
2414 type1; Kmeans;   Elliptic Envelope;   Isolation Forest 
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Table 78- Contribution of each algorithm for the detection of each anomaly 
Id Anomaly_Type DBSCAN EE AffProp IF Kmeans 
1093 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
1215 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
1855 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
188612 type10;  type4; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
18905 type6;  type5; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
20137 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2133 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
22506 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2328 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
23308 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
23496 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
25401 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2697 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2852 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2876 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
291554 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
311082 type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
31754 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
318909 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
320532 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
32076 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
32135 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
321994 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
32203 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
32485 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
32614 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
328563 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
329234 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
336232 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
35839 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
37234 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
38253 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
40499 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
41257 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
41272 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
41522 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
41762 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
4182 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
4298 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
43509 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
43522 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
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43532 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
43534 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
43553 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
43564 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
43565 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
43566 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
43571 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
43843 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
4428 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
45751 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
49936 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
50064 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
50455 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
53239 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
5334 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
5884 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
57 type9; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
58 type9;  type8; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
59 type9;  type8; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
60 type9;  type8; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2936 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
3018 type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
32323 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
336499 type10;  type4; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
36205 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
50396 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim  
53293 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
53320 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
23303 type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
19531 type1; Sim Sim Sim   
23467 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2930 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
31850 type1; Sim Sim Sim   
32194 type1; Sim Sim Sim   
46268 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
5366 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
7657 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2191 type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
23203 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
23513 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
2589 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
2990 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
31792 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim  
32291 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
3293 type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
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341877 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
46680 type1; Sim Sim Sim   
7552 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
7561 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
227543 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
291549 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
328790 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
35778 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
108559 type1; Sim Sim Sim Sim  
23297 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23307 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23348 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
23358 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23380 type1; Sim  Sim Sim  
23443 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
23454 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23460 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23477 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23481 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23523 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23553 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
23559 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
2706 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
289171 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
3027 type1; Sim  Sim Sim  
318526 type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
321881 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
3236 type1; Sim  Sim Sim  
329232 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
3300 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
37480 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
40077 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
40548 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
40570 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
40735 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
41012 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
41703 type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
4228 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
4329 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
4452 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
4464 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
45178 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
45410 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
45663 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
45668 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
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45710 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
46362 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
46541 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
49838 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
49859 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
50051 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
50060 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
53128 type1; Sim  Sim Sim  
5390 type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
6485 type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
7473 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
7575 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
329235 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
41592 type1; Sim  Sim Sim  
4324 type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
4618 type1; Sim  Sim Sim Sim 
23558 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
330543 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
353430 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
41798 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
46669 type10;  type1; Sim  Sim  Sim 
5885 type10;  type1; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
1238 type4; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
2960 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
4234 type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
48357 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
544 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
1998 type4; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
43923 type6;  type5; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
53083 type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
542574 type6; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
162 type5; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
163 type4; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
164 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
165 type7;  type6; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
166 type4; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
19271 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
31772 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
31949 type6; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
320967 type2; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
32109 type6; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
36096 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
39855 type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
39956 type6;  type5; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
46276 type3;  type2; Sim Sim Sim Sim Sim 
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52904 type2; Sim Sim Sim  Sim 
177 type5; Sim Sim   Sim 
111841 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
28529 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
31660 type9; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
31790 type9; Sim Sim   Sim 
31882 type6; Sim   Sim Sim 
31890 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
31967 type9; Sim   Sim Sim 
32020 type9; Sim Sim   Sim 
32041 type9;  type7; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
32083 type9; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
32340 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
32356 type9; Sim   Sim Sim 
32425 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
32538 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
343908 type6; Sim   Sim Sim 
431726 type9; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
43897 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
46184 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
547814 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
552568 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
552575 type9;  type8; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
199 type5; Sim Sim   Sim 
200 type6; Sim   Sim Sim 
201 type6; Sim   Sim Sim 
202 type5; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
203 type6;  type5; Sim   Sim Sim 
204 type6;  type5; Sim   Sim Sim 
205 type6; Sim   Sim Sim 
206 type6; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
207 type6; Sim   Sim Sim 
208 type5; Sim Sim  Sim Sim 
209 type9; Sim Sim   Sim 
210 type6;  type5; Sim   Sim Sim 
211 type9; Sim   Sim Sim 
212 type9;  type8; Sim Sim   Sim 
19318 type9;  type8; Sim Sim   Sim 
316726 type9;  type8; Sim Sim   Sim 
31969 type9;  type8; Sim Sim   Sim 
32506 type9;  type8; Sim Sim   Sim 
46988 type9;  type8; Sim Sim   Sim 
892 
Does not belong to any 
type; Sim Sim   Sim 
44764 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
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2828 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
2474 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
4218 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
24651 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
53187 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
32763 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
53366 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
49841 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
22747 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
31887 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
49895 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
7525 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
49937 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
32188 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
289166 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
18598 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
2484 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
18766 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
44479 type6;  type5;  Sim  Sim Sim 
2538 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
46492 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
42178 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
28393 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
49832 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
3376 
Does not belong to any 
type;  Sim  Sim Sim 
2914 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
4215 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
7434 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
46675 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
345745 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
49767 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
23329 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
53364 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
23177 type3;  type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
33715 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
2688 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
32233 type3;  type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
324239 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
33496 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
311174 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
46943 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
47415 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
289169 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
18796 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
120 
 
45431 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
4214 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
887 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
31823 
Does not belong to any 
type;  Sim  Sim Sim 
28997 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
44999 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
39892 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
289156 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
47243 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
38258 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
32667 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
28679 type5;  Sim  Sim Sim 
487 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
98982 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
7598 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
1599 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
42137 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
7676 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
4221 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
32156 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
7381 type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
1241 type3;  type2;  Sim  Sim Sim 
2414 type1;  Sim  Sim Sim 
 
